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From the mid-19th to the mid-20th century, 
Atlantic City, New Jersey, was a popular beach resort 
that attracted tourists from all walks of life. Statistics 
give us some idea of how the city blossomed during 
the resort’s heyday. In 1858, the city registered 3,000 
visitors; by 1910, it was welcoming 3 million visitors 
annually. This number peaked at 16 million visitors 
a year in 1939.  Over these years, the city also saw 
a concomitant rise in its population, individuals 
attracted to the area because of the jobs created by 
the burgeoning tourist industry. In 1860, Atlantic 
City had 687 residents; by 1915, it was boasting a 
population of 56,000; and the 1930 census recorded 
a peak of just over 66,000 residents. 
  Atlantic City residents differed economically 
and demographically from residents in other New 
Jersey cities and the state as a whole.  Service-
sector jobs and seasonal employment characterized 
the city’s tourist industry. Given the city’s climate, 
the summer months drew the most tourists, and 
consequently, unemployment rose in the first and 
last quarters of the year. As early as 1881, the city 
council started to set aside funds to help the poor 
in the off-season. In addition, a large proportion of 
Atlantic City’s workforce was African-American, 
related to the large increase in the supply of black 
labor available for hire after the Civil War. By 1915, 
21 percent of the city’s population was black. The 
seasonal nature of the city’s employment, which 
consisted of mostly low-paying service-sector jobs, 
and the large number of low-paid African Americans 
in the workforce likely contributed to Atlantic City’s 
having very low household incomes compared with 
the rest of the state.
  Despite its long run as a popular seaside 
vacation town, Atlantic City’s success in attracting 
tourists fell after World War II. Among other 
things, more affordable airfare and an expanded 
interstate highway system gave tourists more 
options for spending both their leisure time and 
their discretionary income. In addition, new resorts 
such as Disneyland overshadowed Atlantic City’s 
attractions.
  The postwar decline was steep. Between 
1960 and 1980 the city’s population dropped from 
more than 59,000 to just over 40,000; it was mostly 
the white population that exited. As tourism and 
the resident population declined, many businesses 
closed and much of the city’s housing stock became 
dilapidated and was abandoned.
  In the early 1970s, an idea took hold that 
legalized gambling could reverse the city’s fortunes. 
In 1976, New Jersey voters passed a referendum 
to bring the gaming industry to the city, and in 
1977, the New Jersey legislature passed the Casino 
Control Act (CCA). The CCA’s key provisions 
included revitalizing tourism and using gambling 
as a “unique tool” to support Atlantic City’s urban 
ATLANTIC CITY: PAST AS PROLOGUE
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY VI    ATLANTIC CITY: PAST AS PROLOGUE
redevelopment. The efforts supported by the 
CCA would also maintain the “existing tone of 
the hospitality industry” and strict regulation and 
control would “maintain and retain integrity, public 
confidence, and trust” in casino operations. 
  Initially, the CCA required casinos to 
reinvest part of their revenues in projects that would 
improve the health and well-being of the city and 
the state at large. But a loophole in the law also 
allowed the casinos to ignore this requirement, 
and by 1984, the CCA had not engendered any 
significant reinvestment in the city. That same year 
state lawmakers amended the CCA to establish 
the Casino Reinvestment Development Authority 
(CRDA), whose stated purpose was to redevelop 
blighted areas in Atlantic City and elsewhere in the 
state, with a focus on low- and moderate-income 
households. This amendment required casinos 
to invest a portion of their revenues in CRDA-
sponsored projects for the first 30 years of their 
existence.  Subsequent amendments to the CCA 
expanded the range of allowable CRDA activities 
to encompass economic development projects, 
including some that directly benefit casinos, and 
expanded the length of the CRDA obligation to 50 
years.
  The first casino to open under the CCA 
was Resorts, in 1978. By 1987, the number of 
casinos had increased to 12 and stayed there until 
2006, when one of the casinos closed. The number 
has remained at 11 since then.  More casinos are 
scheduled to open in the future, although the 
timetable for doing so has been delayed by the 
current credit crisis.
  The casinos have rejuvenated Atlantic City’s 
tourist industry and, to some extent, its employment. 
The number of visitors has soared from 7 million in 
1978 to between 30 and 35 million annually since 
1988, the first full year that all 12 casinos were in 
operation. The casinos have also provided more 
than 40,000 jobs. In addition, a new convention 
center opened in 1997, and several high-end 
retailers and restaurants have also set up shop 
catering to the tourist trade. 
  Although these numbers are impressive, we 
have to look beyond them to see what has actually 
happened in Atlantic City. In most years since 
1988, the casinos have provided jobs for more than 
10,000 city residents, more than half of the city’s 
employed residents. In 2000, casinos provided 80 
percent of the property tax collected by the city, a 
factor that allows the city’s school district to spend 
$1500 more per pupil than the state average. But 
many of the problems that legalized gambling was 
supposed to alleviate remain severe. Atlantic City’s 
unemployment and poverty rates are considerably 
higher than those in the rest of New Jersey and the 
nation. The 2000 census reported that 19 percent of 
the population lived in census tracts that meet the 
definition of extreme poverty neighborhoods; that 
is, they had poverty rates of at least 40 percent. Per 
capita income in the city is among the lowest in the 
state.
  Compounding the situation are a high 
crime rate, an active drug trade, and gang activity. 
Also, despite the city’s high per pupil spending, 
the graduation rate for Atlantic City students is 
considerably lower than that for the state as a 
whole. Vacant houses and lots are a common sight, 
residents have access to few retail outlets, and the 
city has no supermarket. Furthermore, the level of 
noncasino employment has declined significantly.
   Many questions arise as to why legalized 
gambling has not fully lived up to its promise as a 
“unique tool” for Atlantic City’s urban redevelopment. 
These questions apply not just to Atlantic City and 
New Jersey but to other cities and states considering 
legalized gambling as an urban redevelopment or ATLANTIC CITY: PAST AS PROLOGUE    VII 
general economic development tool. Among the 
questions policymakers should ask are:
•	 To what extent do high rates of unemploy-
ment and low levels of labor force participa-
tion stem from a failure to provide workers 
with the training necessary to take advan-
tage of jobs in the gaming industry? 
•	 Would support services increase the likeli-
hood that workers from low-income house-
holds and neighborhoods could obtain and 
maintain jobs in the gaming industry?
•	 Does the framework for regulating the casino 
industry have unintended effects on employ-
ment opportunities for residents of the local 
community? 
•	 Can gambling-financed redevelopment 
agencies, such as New Jersey’s CRDA, be 
designed to be more effective tools of urban 
redevelopment?
•	 To what extent can a state’s gaming legislation 
be designed to encourage better coordination 
among government agencies, residents, and 
other stakeholders — while discouraging cor-
ruption — so that tax revenues raised by gam-
bling are more effective in achieving commu-
nity and economic development objectives?
  The following report offers data and analysis 
that may help policymakers in New Jersey and 
elsewhere answer these and other questions when 
they consider inviting legalized gambling to their 
precincts. The report starts with a brief history 
of Atlantic City, then examines the context in 
which legalized gambling came to town and the 
socio-economic trends that have characterized 
the city since gambling’s advent. These sections 
provide background for considering the paradox 
that Atlantic City presents today as a place where 
plentiful jobs are juxtaposed with high levels of 
poverty and unemployment. The conclusion briefly 
outlines issues that may affect the balance between 
Atlantic City as place of residence and Atlantic City 
as gambling mecca in the future.
  The report’s two appendices present (1) 
detailed information on Atlantic City’s gambling 
industry and (2) economic and socio-demographic 
trends in Atlantic County, where Atlantic City is 
located, since the casinos arrived. A case study 
on concentrated poverty in Atlantic City that is a 
forerunner to the current report is available at http://
www.frbsf.org/cpreport/docs/atlantic_city_nj.pdf. 
 ATLANTIC CITY: PAST AS PROLOGUE    1 
Atlantic City, located on a barrier island 
off the coast of New Jersey, is best known today as 
a gambling destination.1 In 2005, the city attracted 
35 million visitors, a number surpassed among 
U.S. cities only by Orlando, New York City, and 
Las Vegas.2  In the same year, the city’s 12 casinos 
provided more than 40,000 jobs,3 a number about 
the same as the size of the city’s population reported 
in the 2000 census. Yet despite the scale of the 
casino industry, the city suffers from high poverty 
and high unemployment rates. The 2000 census 
reported these rates at 23.6 percent and 12.9 
percent, respectively, much higher than for the U.S. 
as a whole.4
1 From the late 1970s through the late 1980s, Atlantic City was the 
only U.S. jurisdiction outside of Nevada that had legalized commer-
cial casino gambling. Currently, although an additional 10 states 
have commercial casinos in operation, Atlantic City continues to 
rank second, after Nevada, in commercial casino revenues. (Penn-
sylvania has one commercial casino, which opened in Monroe 
County at the end of 2007.)  Twelve states, including Pennsylvania, 
New York, and Delaware, have racetrack casinos.  A number of 
states have casinos located on Indian tribal lands; these are not 
classified as “commercial” casinos.(Source: American Gaming As-
sociation. See http://www.americangaming.org/Industry/factsheets/
general_info_detail.cfv?id=15.)    
2  Official Atlantic City, New Jersey, Travel Guide.  See http://www.
atlanticcitynj.com/
3 The 12 casinos included the Sands, which closed in November 
2006. Currently, the city has 11 casinos.  Data on the number of 
jobs come from the New Jersey Casino Control Commission’s Eco-
nomic Impact Statements, which can be accessed at http://www.
state.nj.us/casinos/financia/histori/.
4 The corresponding percentages from the 2000 census for the U.S. 
as a whole were 12.4 percent and 5.8 percent. Note that poverty 
Today’s gambling mecca is not Atlantic 
City’s first incarnation as a popular tourist resort.  
From the mid-19th to the mid-20th century, the 
city was an extremely successful beach resort. 
Sandwiched between its first and second lives as 
a resort was a period of sharp decline. Today’s city 
both recalls the days of the beach resort and retains 
many of the problems associated with the years that 
immediately preceded casino gambling.  
In the spring and summer of 2007, members 
of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s 
Community Affairs Department studied 
concentrated poverty in three Atlantic City census 
tracts as part of a joint research effort on this 
topic undertaken by the Federal Reserve System’s 
Community Affairs offices.5 The current report, 
whose focus is Atlantic City as a whole, is a follow-
up to the concentrated poverty effort, hereafter 
referred to as the “concentrated poverty case study,”6 
and it is aimed at providing a greater understanding 
of past and present factors that influence the well-
being of the city and its residents today.  
and income data are reported in the census for the preceding year, 
in this case, 1999.
5 Findings from this research, which was conducted in collaboration 
with the Metropolitan Policy Program at the Brookings Institution, 
are reported in The Enduring Challenge of Concentrated Poverty in 
America: Case Studies from Communities Across the U.S., available at 
http://www.frbsf.org/cpreport/.
6  The case study on concentrated poverty in Atlantic City is avail-
able at http://www.frbsf.org/cpreport/docs/atlantic_city_nj.pdf.
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The report starts with a brief history of the 
beach resort, then examines the context in which 
legalized gambling came to Atlantic City and the 
socio-economic trends that have characterized 
the city since gambling’s advent. These sections 
provide background for consideration of the paradox 
that Atlantic City today is a city where plentiful 
jobs are juxtaposed with high levels of poverty and 
unemployment. A concluding note briefly considers 
issues that may affect the balance between Atlantic 
City as place of residence and Atlantic City as 
gambling mecca in the future.
The report also contains two appendices. 
The first provides detailed information on the 
Atlantic City gambling industry, and the second 
considers economic and socio-demographic trends 
in Atlantic County, where Atlantic City is located, 
since the advent of casinos.ATLANTIC CITY: PAST AS PROLOGUE    3 
Origins and Growth
Atlantic City came into being in the mid-
19th century as part of a plan for developing a beach 
resort on Absecon Island off the southern coast of 
New Jersey. The idea for the resort is credited to 
Jonathan Pitney, a physician living on the Jersey 
coast, who initially visited Absecon Island to tend 
to a patient.7 Pitney believed that the proximity of 
the island’s beaches to Philadelphia, particularly 
in comparison to other southern New Jersey beach 
locations, would provide an advantage in attracting 
tourists from that city’s large pool of potential 
visitors. To provide access to the island, a necessary 
pre-condition for the resort’s success, he organized 
a group of investors to build a railroad across then 
sparsely populated southern New Jersey. The rail 
line, connecting the island to Camden, New Jersey, 
across the Delaware River from Philadelphia, 
was completed in 1854, and Atlantic City was 
incorporated as a city in the same year.  Together, 
these events marked the inauguration of a resort 
whose success, enhanced not only by its proximity 
to Philadelphia but to other major Northeast 
population centers, lasted until the middle of the 
20th century. 
7 “Further Island,” as Absecon Island was then known, was at that 
time sparsely inhabited by fishermen; earlier, it had been populated 
by the Lenni Lenape Indians. See Nelson Johnson, Chapter 1, for a 
detailed discussion of the birth and early years of Atlantic City. 
Critical to the scale of popularity that 
the resort achieved was its appeal to vacationers 
from across the class spectrum. While Pitney had 
envisioned a resort for the wealthy and Atlantic City 
was initially marketed as such, the relatively short 
travel time from Philadelphia made it possible for 
working class families to make day trips to the city. 
By the 1870s, deliberate efforts to exploit the tourist 
potential of this group were underway, including the 
development of a second rail line with lower fares, 
advertising targeted to the middle and working 
classes, and the building of rooming houses offering 
inexpensive rates. Subsequent expansion of the 
resort, facilitated by further rail construction, was 
marked by the simultaneous construction of luxury 
hotels and low-budget accommodations. By 1885, a 
guidebook to Atlantic City described its boardwalk, 
initially built to provide access to the city’s beaches 
and to limit the amount of sand that found its way 
off of them, as a place where a “conglomeration of 
classes” promenaded “from morning till night.”8 The 
resort served black as well as white tourists, although 
the terms on which they were received were quite 
different.  (See the discussion on page 8 under 
“Discrimination and Segregation.”)  
Data on visitors speak to the resort’s 
8  See Martin Paulsson, p. 26, quoting from “A Complete Guide to 
Atlantic City,” 1885. See also Johnson, p. 26, for a description of 
the origins of the boardwalk.
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popularity over the decades following its initiation. 
By 1858, there were an estimated 3,000 visitors in 
Atlantic City on a summer day, and by 1872, the 
number of tourists who visited over the course of the 
summer topped 100,000, with 25,000 visitors in the 
city on busy summer weekends.9 In 1910, the city 
had over 3 million visitors,10 and in 1939, during the 
resort’s heyday, the number reached 16 million.11 As 
the resort grew, so did the resident population that 
serviced it. In 1860, the city had 687 residents, a 
number that rose to about 8,000 by 1885 and 13,000 
only five years later. By 1915, 56,000 people lived in 
the city, and the 1930 census reported a population 
of just over 66,000.12
  Atlantic City presented its family visitors 
with a wide range of attractions. In addition to 
the beach and the ocean, the resort provided a 
range of options for vacationing families, including 
amusement piers, elegant shopping, movie palaces, 
and famous entertainers.13  
  But the resort also provided activities that 
did not fit the category of “family recreation.” Its 
many nightclubs were often risqué or exotic by 
the standards of the first half of the 20th century.14 
During Prohibition, the city was unofficially 
“wet,”15 and from its earliest days, prostitutes were 
available on the city’s streets and in its hotels 
and bars.16 Gambling opportunities were available 
in many forms. In addition to numbers games 
9  See Paulsson, pp. 20-21.  Estimates are based on railroad data.
10  See Paulsson, p. 29, citing contemporary sources. 
11  See Bryant Simon, p. 34, citing the WPA Guide to 1930s New 
Jersey.
12  All numbers except that of the 1930 population are reported in 
Paulsson, p. 20, p. 24, and footnote 53 to Chapter 2.
13  See Simon, Chapter 1.
14  See Simon, Chapter 2, for a particularly interesting discussion of 
black entertainers performing for white audiences.
15  See Simon, p. 58; Johnson, p. 104.
16  See Simon, Chapter 2.
and betting parlors for horse races, the city had 
numerous illegal casinos.17 Nelson Johnson writes 
that “complimentary food and beverages were 
served [in the casinos], and the management of the 
casinos paid round-trip railroad fare to any player 
producing a ticket showing they had come to town 
that day to gamble.”18 In light of Atlantic City’s 
future, it is interesting that both Johnson and Bryant 
Simon suggest that the casinos were a particularly 
important source of revenue for the resort.  
That such activities could be conducted at 
the scale and as openly as they were is attributable 
in large part to the degree of municipal corruption 
that characterized the resort. Between 1914 and 
1971, two long-reigning political bosses,19 each with 
connections to organized crime, exercised power in 
Atlantic City, taking bribes for political favors and 
extorting protection money from the city’s illegal 
businesses.20 
  For many years, Atlantic City styled itself as 
the “Queen of Resorts” and “America’s playground.” 
But as the previous paragraph suggests, many 
aspects of the resort and the city that serviced it 
were neither as elegant nor as wholesome as these 
names would suggest. From the vantage point of the 
late 20th century and that of the 21st, other features 
of the city were also extremely problematic and 
perhaps predictive of problems that the city has 
17  See Paulsson, Simon, and Johnson for discussions of gambling in 
the beach resort.
18  See Johnson, p.114.
19  These bosses are Enoch Johnson and Frank Farley. See the 
book by George Sternlieb and James Hughes. See also the book 
by Johnson and the one by Simon. When discussing Atlantic City 
corruption, most historians include a third boss, Louis Kuehnle, 
who was in power at the beginning of the century. Paulsson argues, 
however, that Kuehnle did not have the concentrated power of his 
successors.  
20  Neither Johnson nor Farley ever served as mayor of Atlantic 
City. Paulsson (p. 1) notes that between 1909 and 1984, eight 
of the city’s mayors were indicted or arrested by state or federal 
authorities. ATLANTIC CITY: PAST AS PROLOGUE    5 
continued to face in its incarnation as a gambling 
mecca. Chief among these were the low incomes 
of the resident workforce and the patterns of racial 
discrimination and segregation that persisted until 
the civil rights era.
Underpinnings of the Resort City: 
The Resident Labor Force 
Atlantic City’s resident workforce 
looked very different, both economically and 
demographically, from that of other New Jersey 
cities and the state as a whole. The city’s tourist 
industry was characterized by service-sector jobs and 
seasonal unemployment. In addition, the proportion 
of its workforce and of its resident population that 
was African-American was considerably greater 
than that in other New Jersey cities. It is likely that 
each of these factors contributed to a tendency for 
household incomes to be very low in comparison to 
the rest of the state.  
Table 1 provides decennial census data on 
the share of Atlantic City’s 
employed residents whose 
occupation was classified as 
provision of nondomestic 
services for 1940, when the 
resort was in its heyday, 
and for 1950, when the 
population was still near its 
peak. Data on the share of 
workers employed in the 
manufacturing sector are 
provided for the same years. 
For comparison purposes, 
data on New Jersey as a 
whole and for Camden, 
southern New Jersey’s major 
city, are also given. These 
data illustrate the importance of the service sector 
for the resort economy, particularly in comparison 
with the rest of the state. Other data in Table 1 
emphasize the point that in Atlantic City, service 
jobs were geared to the tourist industry. 
Because of Atlantic City’s climate, tourist 
activity was heavily concentrated in the summer 
months, and given the importance of tourism to 
the economy, one would expect a sharp rise in 
unemployment during the off-season. Seasonal 
unemployment was recognized as a problem as early 
as 1881, when the city council began to set aside 
funds to help the poor in the winter.21 Data on the 
number of jobs and on unemployment claims for 
Atlantic County during a much later period, 1969 to 
1978, are presented in Figures 1A and 1B. Although 
these data represent a time period well after Atlantic 
City had lost its cachet as a tourist resort and cover 
21  See Paulsson, p. 41, citing minutes of the Atlantic City Common 
Council.  Other sources cited by Paulsson indicate that problems 
related to seasonal unemployment were felt most severely by the 
black population.
11940, Census, Table 33; 1950, Census of Population, Vol. II, Part 30, Table 35
21940, Census, Table A-42; 1950, Census of Population, Vol. II, Part 30, Table 35
31940, Census, Table 19; 1950, Census of Population, Tables 28 and 30
41940, Census, Table 19; 1950, Census of Population, Tables 28 and 30
TABLE 1 
Percent of Workers Employed in the Manufacturing Industry, 
Accommodations Industry, and Nondomestic Service Occupations in 
Atlantic City, Camden, and the State in 1940 and 1950




1940 1950 1940 1950 1940 1950 1940 1950
Percent employed in 
manufacturing industry




18.7 19.1 0.8 0.5 1.0 0.7 1.0 0.7
Percent employed in 
service occupations (ex-
cept domestic services)
27.7 28.4 8.5 9.0 7.7 7.1 7.8 7.26    ATLANTIC CITY: PAST AS PROLOGUE
a geographic area that includes but is broader than 
Atlantic City alone, they clearly show the seasonal 
nature of unemployment in a shore economy.22  
That Atlantic City’s employment was 
so heavily concentrated in the service sector is 
closely connected to another feature of Atlantic 
City’s labor market that is strikingly different 
in comparison to other cities in New Jersey, 
the share of African-Americans in the city’s 
workforce.  Atlantic City’s growing demand for 
service workers in the last third of the 19th century 
coincided with the sharp jump in the supply of 
black labor available for hire after the Civil War. 
The opportunities available to these workers were 
largely confined to the agricultural and service 
22  It is possible that these data may understate the extent of season-
al unemployment in Atlantic City during its heyday for a number 
of reasons. First, because the size of summer employment was prob-
ably higher during the heyday, the drop in employment off-season 
would be expected to be larger in absolute terms. Second, the re-
sort sector was probably a larger share of the economic base during 
the heyday, so that the percentage of all workers subject to seasonal 
unemployment may have been higher. Finally, the geographic area 
covered by Hamer’s data includes nonshore areas of the county, 
and seasonal unemployment might be less severe in these areas.   
sectors,23 and they provided a relatively cheap way 
for Atlantic City employers to fill their demand. 
By 1905, 95 percent of the hotel workforce was 
black.24 The importance of black labor to the city 
was such that, by 1915, the black population in 
Atlantic City made up 21 percent of the city‘s 
population.25   
Though prospects for the employment of 
African-Americans opened up somewhat after World 
War I,26 and although black workers were subject to 
replacement by white labor,27 black labor nonetheless 
remained an important component of the workforce 
throughout the city’s beach resort days.
23  See Paulsson for a discussion of opportunities available to black 
workers during this period, especially footnote 61 in Chapter 2. 
Johnson also provides useful statistics from the decennial census for 
this time period.   
24  See Paulsson, Chapter 2, p. 40, citing Herbert James Foster’s 
dissertation. 
25  See Paulsson, p. 32.
26  See Paulsson, Chapter 2, footnote 61.
27  Paulsson, Chapter 2, footnote 66, citing Foster, argues that this 
problem was particularly serious for African-American male work-
ers, who were at risk of being replaced by white females.  Johnson 
(p. 159) writes of a similar situation during the resort’s decline, 
when whites took jobs that had traditionally gone to blacks.
Figure is reproduced from Hamer (1982),  p. 5.   (Data source: State of 
New Jersey, Department of Labor and Industry)
Figure is reproduced from Hamer (1982),  p. 4.   (Data source: State of 
New Jersey, Department of Labor and Industry)ATLANTIC CITY: PAST AS PROLOGUE    7 
Data on the labor force in 1940 and 1950 are 
provided in Table 2. Table 2A contains information 
on the shares of the population and labor force 
that were nonwhite for Atlantic City, Camden, and 
New Jersey as a whole.  In 1940, blacks comprised 
24.4 percent of Atlantic City’s population and 
27.0 percent of its labor force; the percentages 
for 1950 are 27.3 percent of the population and 
30.7 percent of the workforce. The corresponding 
percentages for Camden and for the state as a whole 
are considerably smaller.28 Table 2B provides more 
detailed statistics on labor force activity in Atlantic 
City for 1940 and 1950. The table shows that 
28  In fact, in 1950, among cities with a population above 10,000, 
only one city, Asbury Park — another, considerably smaller, beach 
resort — had a higher nonwhite population share, 28.7 percent.  
Indeed, in addition to Asbury Park, only one other city in this 
group had a nonwhite share that reached 20 percent (1950 cen-
sus).
11940, Census, Tables 28, 33; 1950, Census of Population, Tables 6, 33,     
  35, 36
2 1940, Census, Tables 28, A-41; 1950, Census of Population, Tables 6, 33,   
35, 36
3 1940, Census, Table 4; 1950, Census of Population, Tables 1, 13, 27
4 1940, Census, Table 16; 1950, Census of Population, Tables 3, 13, 25
5 In 1950, population is defined as “white” or “nonwhite” rather than 
B.  Atlantic City Labor Force Activity, 1940 and 19506
TABLE 2
Labor Force in Atlantic City, Camden, and the State, 1940 and 1950
A.  Racial Composition of Labor Force for Atlantic City, Camden, and New Jersey
Atlantic City1 Camden2 New Jersey (All)3 New Jersey (Urban)4
1940 1950 1940 1950 1940 1950 1940 1950
Total population 64,094 61,657 117,536 124,555 4,160,165 4,835,329 3,394,773 4,186,207
% of population that is black5 24.4% 27.3% 10.6% 14.1% 5.5% 6.6% 5.7% 6.7%










1940 80.0% 80.7 12.5 (25.1)8 12.9 (35.5)8










37.6 49.5 14.0 (21.4)8 16.1 (26.9)8
35.4 48.8 8.6 13.8
African-Americans in Atlantic City, particularly 
females, had higher labor force participation rates 
than whites in these years.29 They also had higher 
unemployment rates, considerably so in 1950.  
(Furthermore, the data in Table 2A suggest that the 
racial differences in unemployment rates in 1940 
might have been much sharper had it not been for 
employment provided through public emergency 
work programs.) The higher unemployment rates 
for blacks may reflect disproportionate employment 
in sectors of the economy particularly susceptible 
to seasonal unemployment30 and/or discrimination 
29  This finding may reflect economic necessity, particularly in the 
case of women. However, in 1950, median age in Atlantic City was 
higher than in all but one other city in New Jersey with a popula-
tion above 10,000, and to the extent that the elderly population 
was disproportionately white, this might also contribute to lower 
rates of labor force participation for white women.
30  As previously noted, sources cited by Paulsson indicate that at 
“white” or “black.” 
6 1940, Census, Table 33; 1950, Census, Tables 35, 36 (In 1940 and 1950, 
  the labor force is classified as persons 14 years old and over.)
7 LFPR = Labor Force Participation Rate
8 Numbers in parentheses give unemployment rates in 1940 if those 
employed at “public emergency work,” e.g., the WPA, are not counted as 
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against black workers in the labor 
market.
Finally, and probably 
because of the combination of 
labor market features considered 
above, Atlantic City households 
tended to have incomes that were 
considerably below those in urban 
areas elsewhere in the state. Data 
on income are not available for 
1940, but data for 1950 indicate 
that in that year, among New 
Jersey cities with populations 
greater than 10,000, the city had 
the highest percentage of households with incomes 
below $2000, 53.7 percent (Table 3).31 For the state 
as a whole, the corresponding percentage was 26.1 
percent and in New Jersey’s urban areas, it was 
24.1 percent.  Median income for both families 
and households, $2428 and $1825, respectively, 
lagged those of every other urban community with 
a population above 10,000 in the state by several 
hundred dollars, at a time when the state’s median 
income was itself only $3670 for families and $3285 
for households.32  
the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th, seasonal 
unemployment affected black residents most severely. 
31  Only two jurisdictions in the entire state, each with a population 
under 10,000, had higher percentages of households with incomes 
below this level.
32  Median family income is the preferred measure for comparing 
Atlantic City with the rest of New Jersey. In general, the share of 
households that are “nonfamily” in different communities is likely 
to be related to median household income, while the composition 
of nonfamily households may differ across communities as well. 
(For example, the percentage of such households made up of single 
individuals of working age and the percentage that is elderly are 
likely to vary across jurisdictions.) Both of these factors mean that 
a comparison of median household income across communities 
might have an “apples to oranges” nature.  Comparison of median 
family income across communities probably comes closer to an 
“apples to apples” comparison. 
Discrimination and Segregation 
  Although Atlantic City’s black residents and 
workers were not viewed as equal to whites in the city’s 
early days,33 Atlantic City was not a segregated city in 
the 19th century. With the turn of the century, however, 
discriminatory practices that segregated blacks from 
whites became a matter of public and private policy.34 
Segregation extended to schools, restaurants, and rec-
reation, affecting Atlantic City’s black residents and its 
black visitors.35 Blacks were not allowed into boardwalk 
amusements36 or onto “white” beaches. Many of these 
practices persisted until the civil rights era; segregated 
seating was the rule in Atlantic City’s movie houses 
33  See, for example, an 1893 quote from the Philadelphia Inquirer 
cited by Paulsson, p. 35.
34  According to Bryant Simon, Atlantic City never formally enact-
ed Jim Crow laws, as occurred in the South, but the initial timing 
of public policies promoting segregation in Atlantic City coincided 
with the enactment of these laws in southern states.  Paulsson cites 
contemporary sources that attribute the imposition of discrimina-
tory policies to an increase in southern visitors, who, businessmen 
believed, would be uncomfortable in an unsegregated resort. 
35  Seven Atlantic City hotels were included in the 1941 guide “Di-
rectory of Negro Hotels and Guest Houses,” published by the U.S. 
Department of the Interior.  http://www.nps.gov/history/history/
online_books/nj1/chap4.htm
36  Paulsson writes that in 1904, police began to eject blacks from 
boardwalk amusements.  
TABLE 3
Income: Atlantic City and New Jersey, 1950




New Jersey (Rural) 
Nonfarm        Farm
Median income1 
(All households)
$1,825 $3,285 $3,372 $2,633 $2,203
% of households 
with income 
< $20001
53.7% 26.1% 24.1% 37.9% 45.6%
Median family 
income2 
$2,428 $3,670  $3,754 $3,222 $2,550
1 1950, Census of Population, Section 1, Table 10
2 1950, Census of Population, Tables 32, 37ATLANTIC CITY: PAST AS PROLOGUE    9 




was close to absolute, 
with almost the entire 
black residential 
population living 
in Atlantic City’s 
Northside area 
(see Map 1).  With 
segregation came the 
development of dual 
institutional structures. 
Bryant Simon writes 
that the city had two 
YMCAs, two Elks 
clubs, two Republican 
and Democratic 
political clubs, and two old-age homes38 — one for 
blacks, one for whites. In the late 1930s, after the 
establishment of the public housing program by the 
federal government, one project, Stanley Holmes, 
was built for blacks, and another, Pitney Village, was 
built for whites.39
In a recent interview, a long-time resident 
reflected on her childhood in the city: “When I 
grew up, Atlantic Avenue was a demarcation line 
between Caucasian and black.  If you lived on the 
Northside, everybody knew you were black, or if you 
looked like you were white, you were either mixed 
or you had married a black person. That was it. The 
firemen were black. The policemen were black. The 
postman was black. The schoolteachers were black. 
37  See Simon, p. 118.      
38  See Simon, p. 69.
39   See Simon, p. 73 and p. 191.  By the time Pitney Village was 
demolished in the 1990s, it had long since become a very predomi-
nantly minority project.  
The black churches were on the Northside.”40
Although the civil rights movement led to an 
end to overtly discriminatory policies and expanded 
residential options for Atlantic City’s black population, 
patterns of the segregated city are still visible today in 
the spatial distribution of this population. 
Decline of the Beach Resort
Atlantic City enjoyed a long run, from the 
middle of the 19th century to the middle of the 20th, 
as America’s seaside playground. After World War 
II, however, the city faced serious challenges in 
attracting tourists. Increased affordability of airfare 
and expansion of the interstate highway system 
greatly reduced the advantage that the city’s tourist 
industry received from its proximity to northeastern 
metropolitan areas, while the set of desirable 
40  Personal interview conducted in Atlantic City, March 2007.
* The Northside boundary is based on the description of the Northside circa 1905 in Bryant Simon’s book, p. 66.10    ATLANTIC CITY: PAST AS PROLOGUE
vacation spots was enhanced by the opening of new 
resorts like Disneyland.41 By the 1960s, Atlantic City 
had lost its cachet as a tourist destination.  
The city’s decline was very steep. Between 
1960 and 1980, city population fell from 59,544 to 
40,199. Most of the population outflow was white, 
with data suggesting that nonelderly white families 
were particularly likely to leave. As population fell 
and tourism declined, many of the city’s institutions 
began to close or consolidate, many retail businesses 
closed, and much of Atlantic City’s housing stock 
became dilapidated or abandoned. The city’s resort 
infrastructure, long neglected, began to deteriorate 
as the city faced “severe financial and management 
difficulties.”42 
41  A number of authors, including Simon and Johnson, argue that 
the growing suburbanization of the American population was also a 
factor:  As Americans moved from cities to less densely populated 
suburbs, their new surroundings provided alternative opportunities 
for recreation and relaxation to those they had previously found in 
Atlantic City. 
42  Atlantic City Master Plan, 1987, p. 2.
A range of statistics illustrates the speed and 
the severity of the city’s decline.  Between 1960 and 
1980, the city lost 32 percent of its residents, with 
the loss almost entirely concentrated in the white 
population, which fell by 47 percent.43 Between 
1965 and 1975, the city lost 17 percent of its jobs.44 
The unemployment rate increased from 10.6 percent 
in 1972 to 18.1 percent in 1977. (Comparative 
national unemployment rates for these years were 
5.6 percent and 7.1 percent, respectively.)45 Between 
1960 and 1976, 40 percent of the city’s hotel rooms 
were closed.46 Between 1950 and 1974, tourist 
income shrank from more than $70 million annually 
to less than $40 million.47   
43  Decennial census.
44  See Sternlieb and Hughes, p.178.
45  See p. 6 in the report from the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office.
46   See the 2008 article by Wayne Parry.
47  See Johnson, p. 177.ATLANTIC CITY: PAST AS PROLOGUE    11 
Illegal gambling had injected large amounts 
of money into the Atlantic City economy in its 
heyday as a beach resort. It is perhaps unsurprising, 
then, that by the early 1970s, the idea that 
legalized casino gambling could reverse Atlantic 
City’s fortunes had taken hold among Atlantic 
City’s boosters. After a failed 1974 attempt to pass 
a referendum allowing casino gambling statewide 
in New Jersey,48 New Jersey gambling advocates 
pushed for passage of a referendum that would 
allow casinos in Atlantic City alone, arguing 
that casino gambling would provide a means for 
revitalizing the resort city. State voters passed this 
referendum in 1976, and in 1977, the New Jersey 
legislature passed the Casino Control Act, which 
governs casino establishment and operation.  
Key Provisions of the Casino Control Act
  The Casino Control Act (CCA) spoke 
directly to the issue of Atlantic City’s recovery. In 
its opening section, the act set out the outcomes 
that it was hoped the legislation would accomplish. 
Prominent among these were the revitalization 
of Atlantic City’s tourism industry and the use of 
48  Prior to the failure of the 1974 referendum, Atlantic City’s 
gambling proponents believed that a referendum was more likely to 
pass if gambling was presented as an option for all communities in 
the state. See Johnson, pp. 181-82, for a discussion of this point.
gambling as a “unique tool” to support the city’s 
urban redevelopment.49 
  The opening section of the act also laid 
out ground rules for the process by which the 
revitalization of the tourist industry was to be 
achieved. Development of the gambling industry 
was to occur in a manner that would maintain 
“the existing tone of the hospitality industry” 
and strict regulation and control would be put 
in place “to maintain and retain integrity, public 
confidence, and trust” in casino operations. In 
support of the first of these ground rules, the 
legislation stipulated that gaming was restricted to 
major hotels and convention facilities, defined as 
establishments with at least 500 sleeping units.50 In 
support of the second ground rule, the CCA stated 
that individuals with criminal records could not 
be hired as workers in casino hotels.51 Arguably, 
these restrictions are particularly important in 
understanding how the development of casinos 
affected Atlantic City’s existing businesses and 
its residents, an issue that will be discussed in a 
49 CCA, Title 5, Chapter 12, Article 1, New Jersey Statutes, an-
notated.
50 CCA, 5:12-83.
51  More generally, the hiring restriction applied to those deemed 
not to be of good character. Initially, the hiring restriction ap-
plied to all employees working in facilities hosting casinos. An 
amendment to the act in 1995 removed the restriction from some 
workers, such as hotel employees who did not actually work in the 
casinos themselves.
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number of places in the remainder of the report.52  
To facilitate the gaming industry’s role as a 
“tool of urban redevelopment,” the CCA initially 
required that casinos reinvest part of their Atlantic 
City revenues in projects designed to improve the 
health and well-being of the city and state. Howev-
er, it also provided a loophole to the requirement,53 
and as of 1984, the relevant part of the act had 
not resulted in any significant reinvestment in 
the city.  In that year, the New Jersey legislature 
amended the CCA to provide for the establishment 
of the Casino Reinvestment Development Author-
ity (CRDA), whose listed purposes include the 
redevelopment of blighted areas in Atlantic City 
and elsewhere in the state, with a particular focus 
on benefits to low- and moderate-income house-
holds.54 Under the terms of this legislation, casinos 
are required to invest a portion of their revenues in 
CRDA-sponsored projects for the first 50 years of 
their existence.55  
52  Overall, the CCA provided for an “unusual degree of regula-
tion” by the state.  See the article by Mark W. Nichols. Amend-
ments over time have loosened regulatory controls. Nonetheless, 
regulation of Atlantic City casinos is still viewed by the industry as 
being particularly strict. For example, one casino operator stated in 
2004 that the strict regulations governing the hiring of employees 
led to competition for staff among casinos (Trump Atlantic City 
Associates, 2004 Annual Report). See Nichols for an interesting 
discussion of the significant increase in casino revenues associated 
with an increase in the amount of casino floor space that could be 
used for slot machines.  
53  While the terms of the requirement, as stated in the CCA, were 
complicated, the basic thrust of the language was that casinos were 
required to reinvest 2 percent of their adjusted gross revenues. As 
an alternative to this reinvestment, the act allowed casinos to hold 
the money otherwise required for reinvestment for five years and 
then pay these funds as a 2 percent tax to the state. See the article 
by Joseph Rubenstein. Also see CCA 5:12-144b through e.
54  Legislation pertaining to the CRDA is found in Article 12 of 
the CCA. See Appendix A for more information on the funding 
distribution within the state.
55 Casinos are effectively required to annually invest 1.25 percent of 
their adjusted gross revenue (AGR) in CRDA-sponsored projects, 
either directly or through purchase of bonds that the authority 
issues.  (A casino that chose not to participate in CRDA-sponsored 
projects would be required to pay a tax to the state equal to twice 
the amount of the CRDA obligation. No casino has chosen this al-
CRDA projects could take the form of 
“bricks and mortar” activities, or CRDA funds 
could be used to provide services such as job train-
ing to Atlantic City’s low- and moderate-income 
population; however, the legislation establishing 
the CRDA stated that funds could not be used for 
casino development or expansion.56 Starting in the 
early 1990s, a series of further amendments to the 
CCA expanded the allowable uses of CRDA funds 
coming from casino investment obligations to in-
clude activities supporting economic development, 
including casino development and expansion. 
Other amendments provided supplementary rev-
enue sources, some of them temporary, to support 
such activity. The amended language also states 
that in years 26 through 35 of a casino’s existence, 
the funds it provides for CRDA projects in Atlantic 
City are to be targeted to economic development.57
Meeting the Goals of the 
Casino Control Act:  An Overview
Atlantic City’s first casino, Resorts, opened 
its doors in 1978, the year after the enactment of 
the Casino Control Act. Between 1978 and 1987, 
the  number  of  casinos  increased  to  12,  where  it 
remained until 2006. While the number currently 
ternative.) Under the initial authorizing legislation for the CRDA, 
casinos’ CRDA obligation lasted for only 30 years. In the current 
decade, as the CRDA’s mandate has been expanded, the length of 
the obligation has been expanded as well, first to 35 years and then 
to the current 50 years. 
56  However, the use of CRDA funds for a convention center and 
hotels built in service of that center were allowed.
57 In accordance with its original legislative mandate, the CRDA 
focused its initial efforts on the development of for-sale housing 
for low- and moderate-income households. The CRDA is now 
primarily engaged in economic development activities; much of its 
funding is directed to maintaining a competitive edge for Atlantic 
City as the city faces competition from gambling in neighboring 
states.  More detailed information on CRDA activities is provided 
in a later section of this report.ATLANTIC CITY: PAST AS PROLOGUE    13 
stands at 11, new casino development is planned for 
the near future.58, 59    
As was envisioned, the casinos have 
rejuvenated Atlantic City’s tourist industry. Since 
1988, the first full year in which Atlantic City’s full 
complement of 12 casinos was in operation, the 
casinos have directly provided more than 40,000 
jobs per year. The number of annual visitors to the 
city, which stood at 7 million in 1978, the year the 
first casino opened, has ranged between 30 and 
35 million since 1988.60 A new convention center 
opened in 1997, and in recent years, there has been 
an expansion in high-end restaurants and retail 
stores targeted to Atlantic City visitors.
Assessing the role that the casino 
industry has played as a “unique tool of urban 
redevelopment” is more complex. Since the 
advent of gambling, Atlantic City’s population has 
stabilized at about 40,000. Since 1988, the casinos 
have typically provided jobs for more than 10,000 
city residents;61 since that time, a substantial 
majority of the city’s employed residents worked 
for the casinos.62 Casinos provide 80 percent of 
property taxes collected by the city — allowing 
the school district to spend about $1500 more per 
pupil than the state average63 — and they also 
generate revenues for the city through other taxes, 
58  The particular set of casinos in operation has changed over 
time, even though the number of casinos was steady at 12 until 
the Sands closed in late 2006, dropping the number to 11. See the 
April 2007 article by Suzette Parmley, for a discussion of plans to 
expand the number of casinos.
59  See Appendix A for detailed information on the performance of 
the Atlantic City casino industry.  
60  See the 2007 report from the New Jersey Casino Control Com-
mission, available on its website. 
61  The number of residents employed by casinos fell in both 2006 
and 2007, as did the total number of jobs provided by casinos.  
Reasons for this decline are discussed later in the text.
62  See additional discussion of this point in footnote 86. 
63  See http://www.state.nj.us/education/guide/2007/csgsearch.shtml 
for data on school spending.
including a “luxury” sales tax that predates legalized 
gambling.64 The CRDA has replaced run-down 
housing in what was formerly the city’s poorest 
neighborhood with new owner-occupied units, a 
portion of which were sold to low- and moderate-
income households at below-market rates. The 
CRDA is also a sponsor of Atlantic City’s Hope 
VI project, which will replace a part of the city’s 
old public housing stock with new units on a one-
for-one-basis while also providing new market-rate 
housing.
At the same time, many of the problems that 
gambling was supposed to alleviate remain severe. 
As in the pre-gambling era, the city’s unemployment 
rate and its poverty rate are considerably higher 
than those of New Jersey and the nation; in 1999, 
19 percent of the city’s population lived in census 
tracts meeting the definition for extreme poverty 
neighborhoods, i.e., a poverty rate of at least 40 
percent.65 The city’s median family income is one of 
the lowest in the state.  
In addition, the city suffers from high rates 
of crime, an active drug trade and neighborhood 
gang activity. The rate of HIV infection is high,66and 
despite the school district’s high per pupil spending, 
the rate of high school graduation is considerably 
lower than that of the state.67 Vacant houses and 
64  Property tax data provided for 2001.  See the 2003 report from 
the New Jersey Casino Control Commission, available on its web-
site, for a list of taxes paid by casinos, including property taxes. 
65   2000 census. 
66  In June 2006, there were a reported 811 cases of HIV/AIDS in At-
lantic City. According to the New Jersey Department of Health and 
Senior Services, Atlantic City ranks as one of the 10 cities with the 
highest number of HIV/AIDS cases in New Jersey (as of December 
31, 2006).  Thirty-one percent of the HIV/AIDS cases in Atlantic 
County were in Atlantic City, although in 2000, Atlantic City’s 
population comprised just 16 percent of the county’s total popula-
tion.  New Jersey Department of Health and Senior Services website 
at http://www.state.nj.us/health/aids/repa/cities.shtml.
67  New Jersey Department of Education (NJDOE), “Atlantic City 
2006-2007 High School Report Card,” on NJDOE’s website at 
http://education.state.nj.us/rc/rc07/dataselect.php?datasectionper14    ATLANTIC CITY: PAST AS PROLOGUE
vacant lots are common sights. The city’s residential 
neighborhoods have few retail outlets, and the 
city as a whole has no supermarket. In some of the 
city’s neighborhoods, residents are concerned that 
planned expansion of the casino industry, supported 
to some degree by the CRDA, which has switched 
its focus from housing to economic development 
activities designed to benefit the casino industry,68 
cent5B2percent5D=performance&c=01&d=0110&s=010&lt=
A&st=H.
68  Many recent activities are aimed at helping the industry remain 
competitive in the face of the expansion of gambling opportunities 
in nearby states.
will create new and serious problems in the form of 
displacement. 
In short, although the casino industry has 
provided a substantial number of new jobs and new 
resources to Atlantic City, a large segment of the 
resident population, as in the past, faces serious 
economic (and social) problems. In the remainder of 
this report, we elaborate on this conclusion.ATLANTIC CITY: PAST AS PROLOGUE    15 
Demographic Changes 
Since the advent of gambling, the city’s 
population has stabilized at about 40,000 residents, 
its level in 1980. The white population has 
continued its decline, and the black population 
has also fallen, though to a much lesser degree. 
However, in-migration of Hispanics and Asians 
drawn by the city’s jobs partially offset these declines 
in the 1980s and by 2000 had restored the city’s 
population to the 1980 level (Table 4A). Estimated 
population for 2005 was also about 40,000, and 
projections keep it at this level through 2020.69 The 
Asian and Hispanic populations have tended to 
concentrate in neighborhoods that were formerly 
white, so that despite the city’s changing racial and 
ethnic make-up, the city’s old pattern of segregation 
can still be recognized to a large extent on a map of 
the city (Maps 2A and 2B).  
  Table 4B indicates that other components of 
the city’s demographic make-up have also changed 
over time.  The percentage of the population over 
65 years of age, close to 25 percent in 1970 and 
69  The 2005 estimate was made by the New Jersey Department of 
Labor (see Atlantic County fact book, 2006). The 2020 projection 
is contained in South Jersey Transportation Planning Organization, 
“SJTPO 2030 Population and Employment Projections by Munici-
pality,” June 2006. It should be noted that a number of residents 
interviewed as part of the concentrated poverty case study believe 
that planned expansion of the casino industry will lead to a lower 
residential population over the next 10 years.
1980,70 has fallen considerably and stood at 14.2 
percent in 2000.  (To some extent, this change may 
simply reflect the natural outcome of the aging 
process. However, the Casino Control Commission 
suggests that the net loss of population that Atlantic 
City experienced in the 1980s was in large part due 
to land speculation and casino development,71 and 
statistical and anecdotal evidence both suggest that 
much of the impact from these phenomena was felt 
70  Rubenstein comments that in the years before gambling, Atlantic 
City had two ghettoes: one African-American and one elderly.
71  See the 1998 report from the Casino Control Commission.
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TRENDS IN ATLANTIC CITY 
SINCE THE ADVENT OF GAMBLING
TABLE 4A
Racial/Ethnic Composition, Atlantic City, 1960 to 
20001
19602 19703 19804 19905 20006
Total Population 59,544 47,859 40,199 37,986 40,517
White 
(Non-Hispanic, 1980 on) 63.6% 54.6% 43.9% 30.8% 19.4%
Black 
(Non-Hispanic, 1980 on) 36.2% 43.7% 49.3% 49.7% 42.4%
Hispanic* N/A N/A 5.8% 15.3% 24.9%
Asian* N/A N/A 0.6% 3.7% 10.3%
Other 0.3% 1.6% 0.4% 0.5% 2.9%
*Prior to 1980, Hispanic and Asian were included in the “other” category.
1In some instances, percentages may not total to 100 percent due to 
rounding error. 
21960, Census, series PHC (1)-9, Table P-1
31970, Census, series PHC (1)-15, Table P-1 PHC Census Tracts
41980, Census, series PHC, 80-2-78 Table P-7
51990, Census of Population and Housing, Summary Tape File 1, Table P010
62000, Census, Summary Tape File 1, Table P416    ATLANTIC CITY: PAST AS PROLOGUE
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by the elderly.72)  The decline in 
the share of the population that 
is elderly has been accompanied 
by an increase in the number of 
adults of prime working age, in 
both relative and absolute terms. 
Between 1980 and 2000, the size 
of this group increased by 3929, 
or 23 percent.  
Table 4B also shows 
that nonfamily households and 
female-headed families with 
children both grew as shares 
of all Atlantic City households 
between 1970 and 1990. 
While these shares fell slightly 
between 1990 and 2000, they 
remain above their 1970 levels; 
this is particularly true for the 
share of households that are 
female-headed with children, 
which was almost 50 percent 
higher in 2000 than in 1970. 
The net growth in the shares 
of nonfamily households and 
female-headed households 
with children is of particular 
interest because the incidence of 
poverty for people living in these 
types of households tends to be 
considerably greater than that 
for the population as a whole.73  
Finally, the level of educational attainment 
has increased over time, consistent with the 
72  Examples of elderly displacement accompanying real estate 
speculation associated with the development of the casino industry 
are supplied in a later section of this report. 
73  U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Green Book, 
2004, Appendix H, Table H6.
national pattern of more years of schooling for 
younger population cohorts. However, the city has 
consistently lagged the state.74 In 2000, about 38 
74  In 1980, census data indicate that 7.7 percent of the population 
25 and over in Atlantic City had a bachelor’s degree or higher, 
compared with the state of New Jersey, where the percentage was 
11.8.  In 1990 the same was true: 9.5 percent and 24.9 percent 
TABLE 4B
Selected Other Demographic Information, 
Atlantic City and the State, 1970 to 2000
Atlantic City New Jersey
19701 19802 19903 20004 1970 2000
% of population 
elderly (65+)
24.8 23.5 19.2 14.2 9.7 14.0
Population age 
25 to 64 (number)
19,922 16,825 18,159 20,754 3,357,674 4,537,028
--% of 
population 
age 25 to 64
41.6 41.9 47.8 51.2 46.8 53.9
% of population 
foreign born
9.4 7.7 9.9 24.7 8.9 17.5
--% of foreign 
born arriving in 
U.S. fr.1990 to 
2000
NA NA NA 65.4 NA 41.6
% of households 
that are families
59.6 55.2 52.0 54.9 82.7 70.3




9.4 12.8 15.5 14.0 4.6 6.4




15.7 23.3 29.8 25.5 5.6 9.1 
% of population 
over 25 with high 
school diploma
35.4 48.1 58.3 61.8 52.5 82.1
% of population 
over 25 with a 
bachelor’s degree 
or above
3.5 7.7 9.5 10.4 11.8 29.8
11970, Census, series PHC (1)-15 Tables P-1, P-2, Census of Population Vol. I, Pt. 32, Tables 140, 
148, 153, 158
21980, Census, series PHC 80-2-78, Tables P-1, P-9, Census of Population, Vol. I, Pt. 32, Tables 56, 
115, 117, 119, 124
31990, Census of Population and Housing, Summary Tape File 1, Tables P001, P002, P003, P0011, 
P018; Summary Tape File 3, Tables P042, P057
42000, Census, Summary Tape File 1, Tables P1, P15, P16, P31, P34, P36, PCT12; Summary Tape 
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1960 24.8 - - 24.8
1965 26.6 - - 26.6
1970 25.1 - - 25.1
1975 22.0 - - 22.0
1976 22.6 - - 22.6
1977  21.5 - - 21.5
1978 24.0 3.3 13.7 20.7
1979 31.5 10.1 32.1 21.4
1980 36.4 16.7 45.9 19.7
1981 46.6 27.6 59.2 19.0
1982 47.1 29.1 61.8 18.0
1983 51.2 31.7 62.0 19.5
1984 59.5 36.5 61.3 23.0
1985 60.8 40.1 66.0 20.7
1986 59.7 39.2 65.7 20.5
1987 61.9 41.5 67.1 20.4
1988 61.9 43.1 69.6 18.8
1989 62.3 42.5 68.2 19.8
1990 66.0 47.7 72.2 18.3
1991 59.3 44.5 75.1 14.8
1992 59.6 45.1 75.6 14.5
1993* 58.9 44.1 74.9 14.8
1998 62.4 48.4 79.1 13.1
1999* 60.5 46.8 80.2 12.0
2003 54.8 46.5 87.8 6.7
2004 57.8 44.2 80.2 8.4
2005 59.2 43.9 77.8 13.2
2006 60.7 44.1 74.8 15.1
2007 56.1 38.8 69.2 17.3
percent of Atlantic City’s 
residents over age 25 lacked a 
high school diploma, and only 
10.4 percent had completed 
a bachelor’s degree or higher. 
For New Jersey as a whole, 
only 18 percent of this age 
group lacked a high school 
diploma, while 29.8 percent 
had completed at least a 




  The number of 
private-sector jobs jumped 
sharply in Atlantic City 
after the arrival of casinos. 
Since the early 1980s, the 
casinos have provided a large 
majority of Atlantic City 
jobs, and the industry’s share 
has tended to grow over 
time (Table 5). However, the 
number of casino jobs has 
been fairly flat since 1990 
and, indeed, has declined 
somewhat in recent years, a 
phenomenon that the New 
Jersey Department of Labor 
attributes in part to a switch 
to less labor-intensive forms 
of gambling (e.g., from card 
games to slot machines) and 
to the adoption of labor-
for Atlantic City and New Jersey, 
respectively.  
*All numbers are provided for September of the relevant year. “Covered employment” is  employment 
covered by unemployment and temporary disability benefit laws. The reader should note that job categories 
covered by these laws have not been constant over time, so that year-to-year changes in covered employ-
ment may sometimes reflect changes in covered categories as well as actual employment changes.  Despite 
this shortcoming, these data are used because they provide the most complete historical record. Data 
sources:  For years 1960 to 1975, see Sternlieb and Hughes (1983), p. 178, Table 5. For years 1976 to 1993, 
see Hamer (1995), Table 4. For years 1998 to 1999 and 2003 to 2007, data can be accessed from the New 
Jersey Department of Labor and Workforce website at http://lwd.dol.state.nj.us/labor/lpa/employ/qcew/
qcew_index.html.  (City-level data are not available in tabulated form for 1994 through 1997and 2000-
2002.) Casino employment comes from the New Jersey Department of Labor and Workforce’s Nonfarm Pay-
roll Employment Time Series and from Hamer, Table 4, which also uses this source.  All casino employment is 
“covered employment.”  Noncasino employment is calculated as the difference between all city employment 
and casino employment.  ATLANTIC CITY: PAST AS PROLOGUE    19 
saving technology.75  
On any given day, a nontrivial number of 
casino jobs go unfilled; estimates of this number 
range from 300 to 1000.76 The total number of 
casino jobs fluctuates seasonally, with about 5000 
fewer jobs in the first and last quarters of the year 
than in the second and third.77 Data from a number 
of sources indicate that a high percentage of casino 
jobs have relatively low skill requirements and that a 
high percentage of these jobs are low-paying.78  
75  See the New Jersey Department of Labor and Workforce Devel-
opment’s 2006 Atlantic County fact book.
76  See the report from the New Jersey State Employment and 
Training Commission. See also the interview with Eric Reynolds, 
director of the Borgata worker training program, in the newsletter 
of the Center for Women and Work at Rutgers University, avail-
able at http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/~cww/Newsletters/SP05.pdf. 
Reynolds notes that on any given day, as many as 250 casino jobs 
might be unfilled.
77  See the New Jersey Casino Control Commission’s 2006 report 
available on its website.  
78  For example, a 1998 report based on a survey of casino workers 
indicated that 11.3 percent had less than a high-school diploma 
and 40.4 percent had graduated from high school but not gone 
further.  Only 14.8 percent had completed four or more years of 
college. This report, “Limitations in the Workforce: A Survey and 
Study of Atlantic City Casinos,” prepared by Rutgers University 
for the Casino Control Commission, was based on a survey of all 
casino workers conducted during 1997 and 1998 that had a 78 
percent response rate. The New Jersey Department of Labor classi-
fies a large share of casino jobs as low skill.  New Jersey Department 
of Labor and Workforce Development, Atlantic County fact book, 
2006.  See Table A5 in this report.
      The same two sources also indicate that a high percentage 
of casino jobs are low paying. Figure A1 in Appendix A provides 
information on the distribution of wages among workers surveyed 
for the 1998 Rutgers report cited above.  The authors note that 
workers reporting wages below $5 per hour worked in those casino 
jobs where income was most likely to be substantially increased by 
tips. For most other workers, wages ranged between $7 and $13 
per hour, translating to a range of about $14,500 to $27,040 for 
full-time year-round employment.  More recently, the New Jersey 
Department of Labor reported an average annual wage of $28,840 
(including tips) for the Atlantic County hospitality industry, 72 
percent of whose jobs are provided by the casino industry.  (This 
report notes that “[I]nterestingly, leisure and hospitality is the 
only sector where Atlantic County’s average wage exceeded the 
statewide average…in 2004…[This] can be traced to the gaming 
industry’s unionized hotel and restaurant workers, higher tipping 
rates and a greater proportion of higher-paying jobs compared to 
similar non-gaming establishments.”  
      Finally, data from the 1998 Rutgers report indicate that minor-
ity workers held about 46 percent of casino jobs in 1997 and that 
The Remainder of the Private Sector. 
Data in Table 5 suggest that the casino industry 
has generated little additional employment in 
the remainder of the private sector. Indeed, since 
the advent of legalized gambling, the level of 
noncasino employment has declined considerably. 
Any tendency toward increased economic activity 
provided by purchases from city businesses by the 
casino industry or its employees appears to have 
been more than offset by the supplanting of private-
sector activity by the casino sector itself or because 
of other factors unrelated to the industry.79   
  Both anecdotal and statistical information 
support the conclusion that the casino industry 
has reduced the number of retail establishments 
in Atlantic City. Sternlieb and Hughes note that 
the number of such establishments had fallen 
considerably even before the arrival of casinos,80 
but the economic census shows a particularly sharp 
decline between 1977, the year before the opening 
of the first casino, and 1982, a decline that, for the 
most part, has not been reversed (Table 6). Sternlieb 
and Hughes suggest that speculation associated with 
the arrival of the casinos raised Atlantic City rents 
to a level that was unaffordable to the owners of 
the city’s small businesses.81 Rubenstein notes that 
the requirement in the Casino Control Act that 
women held about 47 percent of jobs. Data from the Casino Con-
trol Commission from 1996 indicate that minority employees were 
disproportionately concentrated in low-skill occupations, however, 
and that both women and minorities were underrepresented among 
employees earning more than $35,000 per year; this underrepresen-
tation is particularly striking for minority workers. (See the 1998 
report from the Casino Control Commission.)
79  It is possible that other private-sector employment might have 
fallen even more in the absence of casinos, and it is therefore not 
possible to conclude with certainty that the casino industry has had 
no positive multiplier effect for Atlantic City. Nonetheless, the data 
provide no evidence for the existence of such a multiplier. Hamer 
(1995) writes that there has been a positive multiplier for Atlantic 
County as a whole.
80  Op. cit., p. 81.
81  Op. cit., p. 91.20    ATLANTIC CITY: PAST AS PROLOGUE
gambling be confined to hotels with at least 500 
guest rooms meant that gambling operations were 
large enough to provide nongambling services such 
as food and beverage provision for their patrons 
in-house82 and they had a clear motive to do so in 
order to maximize time spent on gambling activities. 
This latter point suggests that much of the city’s 
retail activity (and employment) may have simply 
shifted venues; however, such a shift would probably 
not have been neutral in terms of the well-being of 
Atlantic City’s residents because of the effects on 
their consumption choices and, for some residents, 
on their employment opportunities, to the extent 
that casino employment requirements tended to 
82 Rubenstein, 1984.
be more stringent than those of businesses 
that were supplanted. Moreover, the post-
1977 decline in retail establishments does 
not appear to have been limited to those 
businesses that served tourists but also 
includes establishments that would probably 
have been oriented to residents, such as 
grocery stores and dry cleaners. 
    In the past several years, there has 
been some expansion of retail activity in the 
city, most notably in two tourist-oriented 
retail districts, the Walk, located in the city’s 
center and slated for expansion, and at the 
Quarters, located in the Tropicana Hotel; 
both districts were developed under the 
auspices of the CRDA Urban Revitalization 
Program, established by the New Jersey 
legislature in 2001.83 This new retail activity 
is likely a contributor to the growth in 
noncasino private-sector jobs in the recent 
past (see Table 5).
             The CRDA’s Economic Development 
Role. The support that the CRDA’s Urban 
Revitalization Program provides for tourist-oriented 
retail activity is only one facet of the role it plays in 
fostering private-sector economic development. In 
1993, the New Jersey legislature specifically directed 
the CRDA to provide funding for construction of 
hotel rooms, a reversal of the prohibition on using 
CRDA funds for casino development included in 
its authorizing legislation. Since then, additional 
legislative changes to the relevant section of the 
Casino Control Act have supported an increasingly 
broad range of activities that directly provide 
funding for casinos (e.g., funding for an IMAX 
83 Casino Control Act, Article 12.  See the CRDA’s website at 
http://www.njcrda.com/about.html for more information about the 
program.
TABLE 6
Selected Retail Activity, Atlantic City, New Jersey 
(number of establishments)*
19771 19822 19873 19924 19975 20026
All retail 760 406 456 478 NA** NA**
Furniture 10 14 5 3 5 5
Food and 
beverages
100 51 59 56 63 59
Eating and 
drinking places
243 154 146 163 151 145
Clothing and 
accessories
95 58 84 88 89 85
Dry cleaning, 
laundry
34 46 14 12 14 12
*U.S. Economic Census
** In 1977, the Census Bureau switched from using SIC industry classifications to 
NAICS classifications.  As a result, the set of business types classified as “retail” from 
1997 to the present differ from the set so classified in earlier years.
11977, U.S. Economic Census: Geographic Area Series, Retail Trade, Table 6; 1977 
U.S. Economic Census: Geographic Area Series, Service Industries, Table 6
21982, U.S. Economic Census: Geographic Area Series, Retail Trade, Table 8; 1982 
U.S. Economic Census: Geographic Area Series, Service Industries, Table 7
31987, U.S. Economic Census: Geographic Area Series, Retail Trade, Table 6; 1987 
U.S. Economic Census: Geographic Area Series, Service Industries, Table 6
41992, U.S. Economic Census: Geographic Area Series, Retail Trade, Table 5; 1992 
U.S. Economic Census: Geographic Area Series, Service Industries, Table 5
51997, U.S Economic Census, Geographic Area Series, Retail Trade, Sector 44; 
1997, U.S. Economic Census: Geographic Area Series, Other Services, Sector 81
62002, U.S Economic Census, Geographic Area Series, Retail Trade, Sector 44; 
2002, U.S. Economic Census: Geographic Area Series, Other Services, Sector 81ATLANTIC CITY: PAST AS PROLOGUE    21 
theater at one casino, a 
parking lot at another84), or 
for other tourist-oriented 
development, including 
boardwalk revitalization and 
entertainment/retail districts 
like the Walk and the new 
retail space at the Tropicana. 
Not surprisingly, the expansion 
of the CRDA’s economic 
development activities has 
been accompanied by a much-
decreased emphasis on activities 
such as housing development 
that were undertaken under the CRDA’s initial 
legislative  mandate.85 Much of the CRDA’s 
investment activity in Atlantic City today is aimed 
at maintaining the gambling industry’s competitive 
position in the face of the legalization of casino 
gambling in neighboring states.  
Trends in Resident 
Employment and Income
  Trends in Residential Labor Force Activity. 
In 2000, Atlantic City’s resident labor force totaled 
17,683, out of which 15,408 people were employed. 
84  See the article by Serge Kovaleski. See also Tom Carver’s 
statement in response to the New York Times’ CRDA coverage, 
accessible at http://www.casinoconnectionac.com/articles/Keeping_
the_Promise, and see a 1998 list of CRDA activities in Appendix 4 
of the Casino Control Commission’s 1998 report.  
85  Construction of housing to replace dwelling units in blighted 
parts of Atlantic City was an early CRDA focus. (The CRDA’s 
housing activity is discussed later in this report.)  However, as early 
as 1997, CRDA investments in casino hotel rooms, $175 million, 
were almost as large as its investment in housing, $185 million.  
(See Appendix 4 of the Casino Control Commission’s 1998 report. 
For further information on CRDA activities, see this report, the 
New York Times article referenced in the previous footnote, and the 
CRDA’s website at www.njcrda.com.)  In an interview conducted 
for the concentrated poverty case study, Thomas Carver, the 
CRDA’s executive director, indicated that the CRDA no longer 
views housing development as a key focus.  
Of these workers, 10,830, a substantial majority, 
were directly employed by the casino industry.86 
Unsurprisingly, given the dominance of the casino 
industry, a much higher proportion of Atlantic City’s 
workers are employed in the service sector (and hold 
service occupations) than in New Jersey as a whole, 
with service-sector employment concentrated 
in tourism-related jobs. The 2000 U.S. census 
reported that 53 percent of the city’s workers were 
employed in the “arts, entertainment, recreation, 
accommodation, and food services” sector, compared 
to 7 percent for the state as a whole.
  Table 7 presents decennial census data 
on Atlantic City’s labor force size, labor force 
participation rate (LFPR), and unemployment rate, 
86  2000 census data and Casino Control Commission data.  To-
gether these data suggest that about 70 percent of the city’s work-
ing population was employed by the casinos. However, because of 
differences in data sources, it is particularly important to view this 
percentage as an estimate. The reader should note in particular 
that the report date for the casino employment number is Janu-
ary 2, 2001, and thus provides the employment level at the end of 
2000. Because of the seasonal nature of casino employment, this 
level can be expected to be below the annual average. The extent 
to which this leads to a tendency to understate the percentage of 
city workers employed by casinos would depend on the reporting 
date for census data.  See Appendix Table B3 for time-series infor-
mation on the percentage of all casino jobs held by Atlantic City 
and Atlantic County residents.
TABLE 7
















19701 9,985 64.7 8.8 8,724 40.7 8.9 18,709 50.8 8.9
19802 8,373 64.0 10.3 8,820 47.4 12.0 17,193 54.3 11.2
19903 9,751 70.6 10.1 8,879 54.0 9.2 18,630 61.7 9.6
20004 9,299 61.6 15.2 8,454 52.4 10.3 17,683 56.8 12.9
* The labor force consists of persons 16 years old and over. 
11970, Census, series PHC (1)-15 Table P-3
21980, Census, Census of Population, Vol. I, Pt. 32 Table 120
31990, Census of Population and Housing, Summary Tape File 3, Tables P064, P070
4 2000, Census, Summary Tape File 3, Table P4322    ATLANTIC CITY: PAST AS PROLOGUE
for all residents and by gender; Figure 2 graphs 
more complete time-series data on unemployment 
rates from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
for the city, as well as for New Jersey and the U.S.  
Together, these data suggest positive changes in 
labor market activity between 1970, eight years 
before the opening of the first casino, and 1990, 
12 years after that opening. LFPRs rise for both 
men and women, with especially large increases 
for women. The Atlantic City unemployment rate, 
which stood at about 18 percent in 1977,87 fell 
almost continuously from 1978 to 1989, and, by the 
mid-1980s, had fallen almost to the level of the U.S. 
(see Figure 2). 
  This situation reverses between 1990 and 
87 BLS data not presented here indicate that the Atlantic City 
unemployment rate had actually risen sharply in the early and mid-
1970s over its rate at the start of the decade. In turn, that the 1980 
unemployment rate presented in Table 7 is higher than the 1970 
rate is not inconsistent with a falling unemployment rate after the 
arrival of legalized gambling. 
2000. LFPRs for men fall below the 1970 
level, and the male rate of unemployment rises 
above it. Women’s LFPR also falls, and their 
unemployment rate rises, though in neither 
case do the rates return to their 1980 levels. 
Figure 2 illustrates the sharpness with which 
the trend of the previous decade reversed. 
Between 1989 and 1992, unemployment in 
Atlantic City shoots up88 and the gap between 
this rate and those of both New Jersey and 
the U.S. widens greatly. This gap stays large 
in subsequent years, although it has been 
somewhat smaller in the current decade than in 
the 1990s. Why this large gap opened and why 
it persisted are questions of some importance in 
understanding how the casinos have affected 
the well-being of Atlantic City’s residents. A 
related question is why the reversals in the 
LFPR and the unemployment rate trends were 
less pronounced for women than for men. Each 
question is considered below.
  It seems plausible that the sharp rise in the 
unemployment rate that occurred at the start of 
the 1990s, both absolutely and in relation to that of 
the U.S, is at least partially related to a fairly sharp 
decline in noncasino private-sector employment 
at about this time, which is evident in Table 5. (At 
about this time, construction work associated with 
the addition of new casinos would have been winding 
down, and it is likely that much of the new residential 
construction that occurred in the 1980s89 was being 
completed as well. Data for Atlantic County show a 
marked increase in construction employment over 
the late 1980s, followed by a sharp decline at the 
88  The New Jersey and U.S. unemployment rates also rose between 
1989 and 1992, though not as sharply.  
89  New residential construction in the 1980s is discussed in a later 
section of this report. It includes a large number of units built 
under the CRDA’s auspices.
Source: Figure 2 is based on figures presented in a 2000 U.S. Government Ac-
countability Office (GAO) report and in the Federal Reserve Community Affairs 
offices’ System-wide study of concentrated poverty. Statistics come from the 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
*Figure shows the annual unemployment rate for all years except 2008, for 
which this rate was not available.  For 2008, data are provided for September, 
the most recent month for which they are available.  ATLANTIC CITY: PAST AS PROLOGUE    23 
start of the 1990s; county construction employment 
did not return to its late 1980s level until the 
following decade.90 A loss in construction jobs and 
of employment that served the construction industry 
provides a possible explanation for the decline in 
noncasino private-sector employment at this time.) 
If the characteristics of those residents who lost 
jobs in the noncasino sector were such that they 
could not easily find work in the casino sector, e.g., 
because of criminal records, one would expect the 
unemployment rate to rise and — because of the 
discouraged worker effect — the LFPR to decline.91 
Moreover, after 1990, the number of casino jobs 
stayed fairly flat, while the prime-age workforce 
continued to grow. (See Tables 4B and 5 and Figure 
3.) These conditions would tend to exacerbate 
any rise in unemployment or decline in the LFPR 
90  Data on construction employment covered by unemployment 
insurance from 1991 forward, and on wage and salary employment 
in mining, natural resources, and construction from 1990 forward 
are available on the New Jersey Department of Labor and Work-
force Development’s website at http://lwd.dol.state.nj.us/labor/lpa/
employ/emp_index.html.  Data for earlier years are available in 
department publications.
91  Goertzel and Cosby suggest a variant of this hypothesis. See pp. 
62-66, especially p. 66, of their article. 
associated with a loss in noncasino jobs.92 
       That the reversal in labor market 
activity is less pronounced for women than 
for men may reflect gender differences in the 
ability to obtain work in the casino industry. 
(This would be the case, for example, if men 
were more likely than women to have criminal 
records or drug problems, or if more casino 
jobs were in female-dominated occupations 
than in male-dominated occupations.) 
Changes in state and national welfare policies, 
together with training programs aimed at 
supporting these policies, may be another 
factor. Writing at the start of the casino era, 
Sternlieb and Hughes argue that “the paucity 
of job opportunities over a long period, particularly 
for minorities in such a depressed area, has created 
a whole generation of residents with substantial 
problems in adjusting to the workplace — even 
with the best job prospects.”93 Implicit in this 
argument is the suggestion that residents might 
need assistance in developing the basic work skills 
necessary to maintain a job. Ted Goertzel and John 
Cosby note that in the late 1980s and in the 1990s, 
a number of relatively large-scale programs with 
this purpose were developed for welfare mothers. 
While they note that these programs have not been 
formally evaluated, they believe that the programs, 
in combination with the work requirement “stick” 
that was part of federal welfare reform in 1996, 
increased the likelihood that welfare mothers 
would both seek jobs and be able to maintain 
them. The authors further suggest that the types 
of programs provided to welfare mothers were not 
92  In addition, the percentage of city residents who were foreign 
born increased substantially in the 1990s, and a large share of the 
foreign born were new immigrants (see Table 4B). In turn, competi-
tion for low-skill, entry-level jobs may have been particularly fierce.   
93  See Sternlieb and Hughes, p. 89.
Note: According to information provided by the New Jersey Casino Control 
Commission, the number of hotel casino jobs reflects full-time positions.
Source: New Jersey Department of Labor and New Jersey Casino Control 
Commission. Figure taken from 2000 GAO report, p. 18.24    ATLANTIC CITY: PAST AS PROLOGUE
available to Atlantic City’s male residents. 94
  Trends in Income, Poverty, and Use 
of Public Assistance. Income of Atlantic City 
94  See Goertzel and Cosby, pp. 64-65. 
residents lagged that of New Jersey and the U.S. by 
a considerable amount in 1950,95 near the heyday 
of the beach resort, and it has continued to do so 
since the arrival of gambling, as is clear from Table 
8, which provides information on median household 
and family income from the 1970 through the 
2000 decennial censuses. On another measure, per 
capita income, Atlantic City ranked 532nd out of 
566 jurisdictions in New Jersey in 1989 and 543rd in 
1999.96
  Table 8 also shows that Atlantic City’s 
poverty rate has been considerably higher than those 
reported for both the U.S. and New Jersey in each 
decennial census. In 1999, for example, Atlantic 
City’s poverty rate was about two times that of 
the U.S. and more than 2.5 times that of the state. 
Atlantic City also fares poorly on other statistics 
that measure economic need:  The census defines 
individuals living in households where income is 
between 100 percent and 125 percent of the poverty 
line as “near poor.” While the census itself does not 
provide a definition for “low income,” federal and 
state policymakers frequently define low-income 
individuals as those living in households where 
income is less than 200 percent of the poverty line.97 
By these definitions, 30.3 percent of Atlantic City’s 
population was poor or near poor, and 49.9 percent 
was low income, in 1999. For the U.S., 16.5 percent 
of the population was poor or near poor in that year 
and 29.6 percent was low income; for New Jersey as 
a whole, the corresponding percentages were 11.2 
percent and 20.4 percent.  
95  See Table 3.
96  New Jersey State Data Center, “Money Income (1989 and 1999) 
and Poverty (1999): New Jersey, Counties and Municipalities, 
2003,” accessible at http://www.wnjpin.net/OneStopCareerCenter/
LaborMarketInformation/lmi25/pub/NJSDC-P4.pdf.
97  This definition is often used in determining eligibility for public 
programs.  For example, it is frequently used in determining eligibil-
ity for the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP).
Worker Training 
in the Current Decade 
  As is discussed later in this report, it 
is likely that a lack of “work readiness” 
continues  to  be  a  factor  in  the  high 
level  of  unemployment  and  low 
LFPRs  that  characterize  Atlantic  City 
today.    In  interviews  conducted  for 
the  concentrated  poverty  case  study 
that  preceded  this  report,  a  number 
of  worker  training  programs  aimed  at 
improving  Atlantic  City  residents’  “job 
readiness,”  as    well  as  more  specific 
job skills, were identified. As a group, 
these programs target a broader range 
of the population than did the earlier 
programs  discussed  by  Goertzel  and 
Cosby.  One  particularly  large-scale 
and recent example has been an effort 
sponsored  by  the  Borgata  Casino.  As 
part of a Community Benefit Agreement, 
the  Borgata  made  a  commitment  to 
train  and  find  employment  for  2000 
unemployed or underemployed Atlantic 
City residents. By 2003, this effort was 
underway,  and  by  March  2007,  the 
casino reported that it had trained and 
placed 2100 residents, primarily in the 
gaming  industry.  To  meet  labor  needs 
associated  with  an  expansion  that 
created 1600 new positions, the Borgata 
extended the program after meeting its 
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  The use of public assistance 
by Atlantic City households is 
considerably lower today than in 
the years just prior to the advent of 
legalized gambling, when the city’s 
welfare caseload per 10,000 residents 
was extremely high compared to both 
the state and the nation (see Figure 
4).  The timing of the sharpest declines 
in this measure — after the advent 
of gambling and after the passage of 
welfare reform in 1996 — suggests the 
effects that these events had on welfare 
receipt. While the percentage of 
households receiving public assistance 
has fallen greatly, it is still very high 
compared to the state percentage.98 
  Employment and Income 
Patterns Within Atlantic City. The 
statistics associated with the well-
being of Atlantic City’s residents 
presented earlier in this section, such 
as poverty and unemployment rates, 
were calculated on a citywide basis. 
By their nature, they do not provide 
information on how residents’ well-
being, as indicated by such measures, 
varies across neighborhoods or racial/
ethnic groups. For example, the 
citywide poverty rate was 24 percent in 1999; this 
rate could be fairly flat across the city, or it could 
capture a situation in which extremely high poverty 
rates in some neighborhoods are offset by low rates 
in others. Distributional information of this type 
is important both in assessing the nature of the 
problems faced by Atlantic City’s residents and in 
98 In 1999, the percentage of Atlantic City households receiving 
public assistance was 2.7 times that of the state.  Source: 2000 
Census, Tape 3, Table 64.
developing programs to ameliorate them.99 This 
chapter presents key statistics from the 2000 census 
on employment and income patterns by individual 
racial and ethnic group and by census tract.
  Data on labor market activity, median 
income, and poverty/low-income status,100 broken 
99 For example, whether a high incidence of poverty is largely 
confined to one racial/ethnic group or one geographic area has 
implications for targeting anti-poverty programs.
100  Low income is defined here as in the previous subsection.
TABLE 8
Income and Poverty Rates for Atlantic City, 


















   Atlantic City $6,395 $4,257 22.5 24.8 48.2
   New Jersey 11,403 10,371 8.1 11.5 N/A
   U. S. 9,590 7,699 13.7 18.6 N/A
19794
   Atlantic City 13,238 9,807 24.9 32.4 52.2
   New Jersey 22,906 19,800 9.5 10.3 24.3
   U. S. 19,917 16,841 12.4 17.0 31.7
19895
   Atlantic City 27,804 20,309 25.0 30.8 45.8
   New Jersey 47,589 40,927 7.6 10.0 18.5
   U. S. 35,225 30,056 13.1 17.5 31.0
19996
   Atlantic City 31,997 26,969 23.6 30.3 49.9
   New Jersey 65,370 55,146 8.5 11.2 20.4
   U. S. 50,046 41,994 12.4 16.5 29.6
1The U.S. Census Bureau classifies a person as near poor if he or she lives in a household whose 
income is at least 100 percent but less than 125 percent of the relevant poverty threshold.  
2 A person is classified as low income if he or she lives in a household whose income is less than 
200 percent of the relevant poverty threshold.  (The U.S. Census Bureau does not define low 
income. The classification used here is often used by federal and state policymakers; for example, 
eligibility for some government programs is based on this classification.) 
31970, Census of Population and Housing, Series PHC (1): Census Tracts, P-4; 1970, Census of 
Population, Tables 58, 94, 95, 199, 206
41980, Census of Population, Vol. 1, Pt. 32 Tables 71, 72, 107, 108, 124, 125
51990, Census of Population and Housing, Summary Tape File 3, Tables P080A, P107A, P121
62000, Census, Summary Tape File 3, Tables P53, P77, P88. (The U.S. poverty rate reported here 
is somewhat higher than the 1999 rate based on CPS data, which is the rate typically reported in 
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out by racial/ethnic groups, are presented in Table 
9A on page 27. Although there is considerable 
variation in the level of these variables across 
groups, the data indicate that problems such as 
high poverty and high unemployment are not 
confined to a particular group within the city. For 
each group, median family income is considerably 
lower than the overall New Jersey median and is 
also considerably lower than for the same group 
within New Jersey as a whole. For each group, 
poverty rates are higher than the national average 
for the same group, though in the case of the 
Asian population, only marginally so. In addition, 
each group has a poverty rate that is higher than 
for members of the same group in New Jersey as a 
whole. Poverty rates are particularly high among 
blacks and Hispanics, who together comprise 
about 67 percent of the resident population.  In 
addition, 55 percent of blacks and 58 percent of 
Hispanics are classified as low income.
  With the exception of the Asian 
population, the male unemployment rate is 
considerably higher in each Atlantic City racial/
ethnic group than the corresponding rate for 
the same group in the state as a whole and the 
national rate. In contrast, female unemployment 
in each group is closer to the corresponding rate 
for the group in the state as a whole and to the 
overall national rate; for Asians and Hispanics, 
female unemployment rates are lower than the 
corresponding state rates.
One of the most striking variations across 
the city occurs in the percentage of employed 
workers whose industry is classified as “Arts, 
Entertainment, Recreation, Accommodation, and 
Food Services”; the vast majority of workers in this 
category presumably work in the casinos (Table 9B 
on page 28). More than 65 percent of employed 
Asian and Hispanic males work in this industry, 
while the corresponding percentages for whites and 
blacks are 45 percent and 39 percent, respectively. 
Among employed females, the pattern is similar: 61 
percent of Hispanic females and 72 percent of Asian 
females work in the industry, while only 47 percent 
of white females and 44 percent of black females do 
so. There may be several sources for this pattern. 
Noncasino jobs may be more attractive than casino 
jobs, and blacks and whites, who are likely to have 
longer-term roots in the city than members of the 
Asian and Hispanic population, may have better 
access to noncasino jobs. Criminal records may bar 
a larger percentage of the population from certain 
categories of casino jobs in some racial/ethnic groups 
than in others. The percentage of households that 
consist of single mothers with children under 18 is 
highest in the black population at approximately 29 
percent,101 and given the round-the-clock nature of 
101  However, the percentage of Hispanic households classified as 
“female-headed with children under 18,” at close to 22 percent, 
is also quite high.  (Percentages of black and Hispanic households 
that are of this type are calculated using data from the 2000 cen-
sus.)
Source: The figure is taken from the GAO report cited in the references. 
The GAO analyzed data obtained from the Atlantic County Department of 
Family and Community Development, the Bureau of the Census, and the 
U. S. Department of Health and Human Services.ATLANTIC CITY: PAST AS PROLOGUE    27 
casino activity, such mothers may find it difficult to 
meet casino schedule requirements, especially in the 
absence of high-quality day care.102  
  Maps showing the geographic distribution 
of a number of economic indicators are presented 
on page 29. The maps suggest that low income and 
phenomena related to it are common throughout 
the city’s neighborhoods. In all but two tracts, 
the percentage of the population classified as low 
income, i.e., living in a household with an income 
less than two times the relevant poverty line for 
that household, is at least 10 percentage points 
higher than in the U.S. as a whole.  All tracts have 
median family incomes below the U.S. median of 
$50,046, with only two tracts coming within $6000 
of this median; all tract medians are well below 
102 Residents interviewed for the concentrated poverty case study 
often cited the absence of safe, affordable day care as a factor that 
limited parents’ ability to maintain casino employment.
the New Jersey median family income of $65,370 
(Map 3). The male unemployment rate is higher 
than the national rate in all tracts, and in only one 
case is the tract rate within one percentage point 
of the national rate.103 The female unemployment 
rate is higher than that of the U.S. in all but two of 
the city’s 14 tracts, and in only two of the other 12 
tracts is the tract rate less than one percentage point 
higher than the U.S. rate (Map 4).
  At the same time, there are clear 
differences across tracts. In general, problems tend 
to be most severe in the northeastern part of the 
city, which is predominantly black. For example, 
the male unemployment rate is above 20 percent 
in much of the northeastern part of the city but 
typically below 12 percent elsewhere. (Female 
103  Unemployment calculations using data from the 2000 U.S. 
census give male and female civilian unemployment rates of 5.7 
percent and 5.8 percent, respectively.  
TABLE 9A
Economic Indicators by Racial/Ethnic Group for Atlantic City, New Jersey, and the U.S., 2000



















Income1 27,708 44,539 33,332 29,836 40,105 34,397 47,295 78,391 59,471 39,542 73,043 54,698
Income 
status2
--Poor (%)3 29.6 18.5 24.8 23.1 17.9 22.6 13.0 6.8 12.6 17.4 4.7 8.1
--Poor or 
Near Poor 
(%) 38.6 23.0 31.0 29.7 23.8 30.3 14.0 8.8 16.2 21.7 6.5 11.2
--Low 
Income (%) 55.1 36.5 47.7 58.1 41.4 51.4 26.1 15.9 27.6 35.3 13.2 22.3
Unemploy-
ment Rate:  
Male4 23.6 12.8 12.3 14.3 8.5 8.3 1.3 4.2 5.0 12.8 4.2 4.4
Unemploy-
ment Rate:  
Female 13.5 10.5 10.9 9.7 10.7 10.7 3.9 5.0 5.3 6.4 4.1 4.3
12000, Census, Summary Tape File 4, Table PCT113
22000, Census, Summary Tape File 4, Table PCT142
32000, Census, Summary Tape File 4, Table PCT141.  “Near poor” and “low income” are defined as in the footnotes to Table 8.
4For both male and female unemployment statistics, the following sources were used: 2000, Census, Summary Tape File 3, Tables P150H and P150I; 2000, 
Census, Summary Tape File 4, Table PCT79  28    ATLANTIC CITY: PAST AS PROLOGUE
Since 1980, the year-
round housing stock has 
fallen about 7 percent, 
but the vacancy rate in 
this stock has remained 
high; it stood at about 13 
percent in 2000.107 While 
this number might suggest 
that housing units can be 
easily found, it is important to note that throughout 
the gambling era, the vacancy rate has overstated 
housing availability, since a high percentage of year-
round vacant units are neither for sale nor rent. In 
2000, for example, 6 percent of the year-round stock 
belonged to this category, which is designated “other 
vacancies.”108 
The large majority of the city’s households 
have historically been renters, and this continues 
to be the case today: 71 percent of households were 
renters in 2000, compared to 34 percent for the 
state as a whole. In the past 50 years, the Atlantic 
City rental stock has included a large number of 
subsidized units, including public housing, privately 
owned HUD-subsidized developments, and low-
income housing tax credit properties; in the 
early 1980s, more than 20 percent was subsidized 
percent of the city’s housing units were in substandard condition 
(Sternlieb and Hughes, p. 113). Unfortunately, comparable statis-
tics are not available for later years. However, some of the city’s 
worst stock was demolished and replaced by CRDA-sponsored 
units, suggesting that this percentage is likely lower today.    
107  In comparison, the vacancy rate for year-round units for the 
state of New Jersey was 4 percent in 2000.  However, Atlantic 
City’s 2000 rate of 13 percent is similar to that of Trenton (13 
percent), in central New Jersey, and below that of Camden (19 
percent), in the south-central part of the state.  
108  In 1990, 73 percent of “other vacancies” were boarded up. 
(Statistics were calculated from the 1990 census. The 2000 census 
does not report on number of boarded-up units.)  As was the case 
with the overall vacancy rate for year-round units for 2000, the 
percentage of the stock falling into the “other vacancy” category 
is very high compared to that of the state as a whole but similar in 
magnitude to that in Trenton (6 percent) and considerably below 
that of Camden (13 percent).
unemployment, while it is also more severe in the 
northeastern census tracts, does not vary as greatly 
across the city.) The 1999 poverty rate is close to 
the national average of 12.4 percent in most of the 
southwestern part of the city; in the northeastern 
part of the city, the poverty rate is considerably 
above the national rate in many tracts.                                 
 Atlantic City as Residence: 
Trends in Housing
  The Housing Stock and Its Use. Housing 
statistics for Atlantic City at the start of the 
gambling era reflect the city’s decline over the 
previous decades. In 1980, the decennial census 
year closest to the start of the gambling era, the 
census reported that Atlantic City had 19,635 units 
in its year-round housing stock (Table 10, page 30). 
Almost 15 percent of these year-round units were 
classified as vacant,104 unsurprising in a city whose 
population had fallen 35 percent since 1950.105,106  
104 The overall vacancy rate was considerably higher (22.2 per-
cent) than the 15 percent vacancy rate for the year-round stock, 
reflecting the large number of seasonally vacant vacation homes 
that one would expect in a shore community. For example, in 1980, 
8.8 percent of all housing units were classified as seasonally vacant 
migratory housing or vacant, held for occasional use.
105  Interestingly, the 1950 and 1960 censuses indicate that the 
housing stock actually grew during the 1950s and maintained its 
level in the 1960s despite substantial population loss over this 
period. 
106  Moreover, according to a survey of residential properties 
conducted by the Atlantic City Planning Department in 1979, 23 
TABLE 9B
Resident Employment in Arts, Entertainment, Recreation, 
Accommodations, and Food Services by Race/Ethnicity and Gender, 
Atlantic City, 2000 
Employment as percentage of employed  persons*
African-American Hispanic Asian White
Male 39.1 66.4 69.9 44.7
Female 44.0 60.7 72.3 47.2
*2000, Census, Summary Tape File 4, Table PCT85ATLANTIC CITY: PAST AS PROLOGUE    29 
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24,055 18.7 22,737 14.0 1.8 68.9 NA NA 6.1
Atlantic City, 
19803
21,520 22.2 19,635 14.8 4.7 69.4 NA NA 5.7
Atlantic City, 
19904
21,626 27.3 19,287 18.4 5.7 69.6 NA NA 14.8
Atlantic City, 
20005
20,219 21.6 18,273 13.3 5.7 71.1 20.8 5.5 12.5
New Jersey, 
2000
3,310,275 7.4 3,200,954 4.3 1.5 34.4 22.8 10.5 5.0
U.S., 2000 115,904,641 9.0 112,300,425 6.1 2.0 33.8 32.8 17.0 5.7
1 Other vacancies are year-round units that are not for sale or rent (or sold or rented and waiting for occupancy).
2 1970, Census, series PCH (1)-15 Tables H-1, H-8
3 1980, Census, series PCH 80-2-78, Tables H-1
4 1990, Census, Summary Tape File 1, Tables H001, H002, H003, H005, H021, H022
5 2000, Census, Summary Tape File 1, Tables H3, H5, P15; 2000, Census, Summary Tape File 3, Tables H7, H20, H34
housing;109 in 2000, subsidized housing made up 
19 percent of the total and 21 percent of the year-
round housing stock.110 (The subsidized stock is 
disproportionately concentrated in three adjacent 
census tracts that form the study area for the case 
study of concentrated poverty referenced in the 
introduction. These tracts contain only 19 percent of 
Atlantic City’s population but hold about 46 percent 
of the subsidized stock, which is, in turn, a key factor 
in the concentration of poverty in these tracts.)
Overall, Atlantic City’s housing stock is 
somewhat older than that of New Jersey as a whole. 
In 2000, the shares of units built before 1950 in 
Atlantic City and New Jersey were 37 percent and 
30 percent, respectively.111 Nonetheless — and 
109  See Sternlieb and Hughes, p. 113.      
110  Calculated using data from the U.S. Department of Housing and 
Urban Development’s assisted housing database and from the 2000 
census.
111  2000 census, Summary File 3, Table H34. 
despite the overall decline in year-round units — 
the city saw a nontrivial amount of new residential 
construction between 1980 and 2000.  Twenty-one 
percent of the city’s housing stock was built in this 
20-year period, with the large majority of units built 
in the 1980s, the decade immediately following 
the introduction of gambling. In comparison, the 
percentage of units built in New Jersey as a whole 
during the two-decade period, 23 percent, is similar to 
that for Atlantic City, but construction is more evenly 
spread across the two decades (Table 10). 
The new construction in Atlantic City in the 
1980s was dominated by two large undertakings.  First, 
the CRDA developed new owner-occupied housing 
in the city’s North Inlet neighborhood. (In total, by 
2004, the CRDA had developed 1394 new housing 
units for owner occupancy;112 20 percent of these were 
designated for low- and moderate-income households 
112  See the article by Yvonne Bonitto-Doggett.ATLANTIC CITY: PAST AS PROLOGUE    31 
City house prices lagged those 
of the state considerably. 
The period immediately 
following legalization saw a 
fast run-up in house prices 
and considerable activity 
by speculators. Between 
1970 and 1980, house prices 
increased considerably more 
rapidly in Atlantic City 
than in the state or nation 
(Table 11).  (Speculation 
was accompanied by some 
displacement of households; 
elderly and minority 
households appear to have been particularly 
affected.115)  Between 1980 and 2000, the rate of 
house-price appreciation was considerably lower, 
though the strong price run-up in the 1970s resulted 
in faster overall appreciation in Atlantic City than 
in either New Jersey or the U.S. over the full period 
from 1970 to 2000.  
  The current decade has again seen consid-
erable run-up in house prices (at least until recent 
115 Sternlieb and Hughes give a number of examples of the impact 
of the speculation on residents. For example, they cite a 1977 
Temple University study that found evidence of a systematic effort 
to evict Hispanic, poor, and elderly residents from one city neigh-
borhood, described cases where the elderly were required to leave 
their apartments on very short notice and a case where elderly 
households faced a 400 percent increase in rent with one month’s 
notice, and noted that the elderly population in Atlantic City 
receiving Social Security benefits declined 7.2 percent from 1977 to 
1979. (Statistics showing the sharp decline in the elderly’s share of 
total population are provided in Table 4B.)  They also cite the New 
Jersey Department of Community Affairs, which reported at that 
time that the lack of housing and high prices were paramount to 
the loss of the city’s elderly population.  Sternlieb and Hughes note 
further that the minority population faced a particularly difficult 
situation as a result of post-casino speculation because “[o]ther 
areas [were] far less hospitable to them than Atlantic City, which 
historically … had a large minority population” (Chapter 7).
     Speculation was often accompanied by illegal activity. Ac-
cording to Bryant Simon, in 1981, of 117 fires in the city’s South 
Inlet neighborhood, fire fighters considered 105 to be suspicious 
(p.184). 
TABLE 11
Median House Values and Changes in Values, 1970-2000
Median House Value Percent Change








U.S. $17,000 $47,200 $78,500 $119,600 177.6 66.3 52.4 603.5
New 
Jersey
$23,400 $60,200 $161,200 $170,800 157.3 167.8 6.0 629.9
Atlantic 
City
$10,600 $40,600 $70,200 $87,500 283.0 72.9 24.6 725.5
11970, Census of Population, Vol. 1, Pt. 1, Table 5, Pt. 32, Tables 5, 10
2 1980, Census, series PHC 80-2-78, Table H-1; Historical Census of Housing Tables: Home Values, Table 
“Median Home Values: Unadjusted”; http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/census/historic/values.html
31990, Census of Population and Housing, Summary Tape File 3, Table H061A
4 2000, Census, Summary Tape File 3, Table H76
and were subsidized to make them affordable to such 
households, while the remainder were sold at market 
rate.) Second, a large condominium complex was built 
in the southeastern part of the city.  
Since 2000, it appears that the city has 
experienced an increase in the construction of 
new housing.  (Thus far in the current decade, the 
number of residential building permits issued has 
been more than 50 percent greater than for the 
entire decade of the 1990s.113) New activity includes 
both the construction of properties aimed at the 
higher end of the housing market and a Hope VI 
project that is slated to replace 213 units of public 
housing on a one-for-one basis and also provide 
about 300 units of market-rate housing.114
  Housing Prices and Housing Affordability. 
In 1970, before legalized casino gambling, Atlantic 
113  Data from the website of the New Jersey Department of Labor 
and Workforce Development, accessed at http://lwd.dol.state.nj.us/
labor/lpa/industry/bp/bp_index.html. Given current problems in 
the housing industry, it is not clear how well the number of permits 
tracks actual construction activity.
114  While the CRDA is involved in the Hope VI project, the agency 
sees little future role for itself as a housing developer and has, for 
the most part, shifted its attention to economic development. 
Interview with CRDA executives, April 2007.32    ATLANTIC CITY: PAST AS PROLOGUE
problems in the national housing market). In the 
fourth quarter of 2004, Atlantic City had the stron-
gest one-year house-price appreciation in the North-
east for metropolitan areas tracked by the National 
Association of Realtors (NAR). In the fourth quar-
ter of 2005, Atlantic City ranked 12th in the nation 
on its one-year house-price appreciation rate, and it 
ranked first in the nation for the corresponding rate 
in 2006.116 A 2005 article in the Press of Atlantic City 
discussed the impact of this appreciation on hous-
ing affordability. The article suggested that “[t]he 
area’s soaring housing market has squeezed afford-
able housing in at least two ways.  The prices being 
paid for new housing are so high that there is little 
incentive for private developers to build anything 
low-income families can afford.  And existing low-
cost housing is being lost as developers tear down 
older buildings to replace them with expensive new 
homes.”117  
  Information from a series of focus groups 
and personal interviews in Atlantic City from March 
through May of 2007 indicates that housing afford-
ability is a serious concern among Atlantic City 
residents.118  House-price appreciation, along with 
a planned real estate tax revaluation in 2008, has 
led to fears of displacement among some of Atlan-
tic City’s elderly long-term homeowners.119 Inter-
viewees also noted that high rental costs have led to 
116  Metropolitan-level house-price appreciation data for the most 
recent three years are available on the NAR’s website. Data for 
earlier years may be purchased from the NAR or located on the 
websites of organizations that reported on NAR statistics at the 
time of their release. http://www.realtor.org/research/research/
reportsstatistics
117  See the article by John Froonjian.
118 These focus groups and personal interviews were conducted as 
part of the concentrated poverty case study.   
119  The revaluation was completed in early 2008. While New Jersey 
has programs that may assist elderly and low-income homeowners 
affected by the revaluation, comments made by interviewees sug-
gest that they were largely unaware of the programs in 2007, when 
the interviews were conducted.      
overcrowding,120 doubling up of households, and an 
increased rate of homelessness among families.  
Planned expansion by the casino industry 
and development pressures in general have raised 
further questions about the long-term availability 
of affordable rental housing. In what is known as 
the Back Maryland neighborhood of Atlantic City, 
for example, where housing is HUD-subsidized 
but privately owned, there is concern that with 
the expirations of owners’ contractual obligations 
with HUD to maintain the housing for low-income 
households, housing developments will be removed 
from the low-income stock.121 The state of New 
Jersey’s limited dividend law has provisions requiring 
that low-income units built under the law’s auspices 
be maintained as low-income housing after the 
HUD requirement expires. However, it is not yet 
clear whether steps taken under these provisions 
will be effective in preserving stock for use by low-
income families.  
A Note on Local Government Post-
Gambling:  New Resources, New Needs, 
Ongoing Municipal Corruption
Gambling brought new tax revenues to 
Atlantic City and its school district.  Local property 
tax revenue, including those for the school district, 
120  Data from the 2000 census suggest that overcrowding is par-
ticularly severe among the city’s Asian and Hispanic households.  
About 34 percent of Asian dwelling units and about 30 percent of 
Hispanic dwelling units have more than one person per room. 
121  In general, in return for HUD subsidization of privately owned 
properties, their owners agree to maintain them as part of the low-
income stock for some period, most often 30 years. According to 
the National Housing Trust, this affordability requirement was due 
to expire in 2007 for 375 units in the privately owned subsidized 
stock in Back Maryland. An additional 232 units in the balance 
of Atlantic City have a 2009 expiration date (www.nhtinc.org). In 
late 2006, the four projects in Back Maryland with 2007 expiration 
dates were placed on the market.  While no deal materialized at 
that time, the possibility of the sale raised serious concerns about 
displacement among Back Maryland residents.  ATLANTIC CITY: PAST AS PROLOGUE    33 
increased 575 percent in nominal terms and 403 
percent in real terms, between 1978 and 2001. The 
city also saw a sharp rise in receipts from a luxury 
sales tax that predated legal gambling.122 
The casinos also brought new expenses to 
the city. For example, while Atlantic City’s rates for 
criminal activity were already higher than national 
rates before the legalization of gambling, the arrival 
122  See Table A3 for data on taxes paid by the casino industry to 
Atlantic City.
of the casinos was accompanied 
by a large increase in such 
criminal activity, with much 
of the increase associated with 
the much-expanded tourist 
population123 (Table 12). In 
turn, Atlantic City maintains a 
police force much larger than 
one might expect for a city of 
its size.124 The huge number 
of visitors likely adds to the 
costs of maintaining the city’s 
infrastructure as well.
Given the simultaneous 
increase in revenues and costs 
associated with the gambling 
industry, an analysis of the 
overall extent to which gambling 
revenues have increased 
the fiscal capacity of local 
government to provide programs 
that directly affect the quality of 
life of the city’s residents is well 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
(However, in at least one area 
related to residents’ quality of 
123  Both violent and property crime rates in Atlantic City are signif-
icantly higher than they are in the surrounding metropolitan area. 
In part, this reflects the fact that as a tourist destination, Atlantic 
City has a daily population that is much higher than its resident 
population. As noted in a 2000 GAO report examining gambling in 
Atlantic City, “Visitors become part of the pool who may both com-
mit and become victims of crime and therefore should be added to 
the resident population when calculating the crime rate.” See the 
GAO report in the references. Even when such an adjustment is 
made, Atlantic City’s crime rate is higher than that of New Jersey 
as a whole.  
124  For example, the number of police protection employees in New 
Brunswick, with a 2000 population about 20 percent larger than 
that of Atlantic City, was only 25 percent that of Atlantic City’s in 
2002.  Jersey City with a 2000 population almost six times that of 
Atlantic City had less than two times the 2002 number of employ-
ees in police protection.  For further examples, see Table 2 in the 
U.S. Census of Governments report. 
TABLE 12
Total Crimes per 10,000 Population*
Year United States  New Jersey Atlantic City 
(based on the population adjusted to in-




1977  507.76 511.39  695.89 1,006.00
1978 514.03 520.72  768.66 1,336.00
1979 556.55 582.06  798.62 1,678.00
1980 595.00 640.13  1079.29 3,109.37
1981 585.82 617.98  922.29 3,132.91
1982 560.36 567.61 986.85 3,863.68
1983 517.50 516.34  947.99 4,168.01
1984 503.13 485.55  763.01 3,537.48
1985 520.71 509.44  857.61 4,203.70
1986 548.04 524.13  850.56 4,179.05
1987 555.00 526.15  749.90 3,963.67
1988 566.42 529.53  833.44  4,593.15
1989 574.10 526.94  794.57  4,323.13
1990 582.03 544.72  800.75  4,107.04
1991 589.78 543.13  808.80  4,047.54
1992 566.02 506.44  721.22 3,597.11
1993 548.44 480.08  641.31  3,144.05
1994 537.35 466.09  509.63  2,555.94
1995 527.59 470.37  538.08  2,902.93
1996 508.66 433.29  525.89  2,874.49
1997 493.00 405.70  526.49  2,776.26
Note: While the GAO shows the crime rate based on both the unadjusted and adjusted Atlantic City 
population, it believes that the rate based on the adjusted population, which includes visitors and non-
resident workers, is the more appropriate rate calculation.
Source: GAO analysis of data obtained from the FBI’s UCR, South Jersey Transportation Authority, and 
the Census Bureau.
* Table 12 is taken from the GAO report listed in the references.34    ATLANTIC CITY: PAST AS PROLOGUE
life — providing education — it is fair to say that 
casino tax revenues have increased fiscal capacity. In 
the absence of school taxes paid by casinos, Atlantic 
City’s school district would likely qualify as a New 
Jersey “Abbott District,” i.e., a district that received 
extra funding to ensure its ability to provide an 
adequate level of education spending.125) Regardless 
of the net effect of casino revenues on the city’s fiscal 
capacity, there is little confidence among at least 
some of the city’s service providers and residents that 
these revenues are spent in ways that best serve the 
interests of the city and its residents. Interviewees for 
the concentrated poverty case study stressed 
125 A discussion of criteria for designation as an Abbott District 
can be accessed at http://www.state.nj.us/education/abbotts/regs/
criteria.htm.
the lack of needed services, as well as the city’s 
lack of attention to problems with neighborhood 
infrastructure.   
A number of interviewees also stressed 
the strong role that political considerations play 
in how local government funds are distributed.  
This perception is supported by the city’s ongoing 
corruption problems, which extend a trend going 
back to the early years of the 20th century. An article 
in the Philadelphia Inquirer noted that “[o]ne third 
of last year’s city council members are either in 
prison or on its [sic] way there. Four of the last eight 
mayors have been arrested on corruption charges.”126
126 See the 2007 article by Wayne Parry.ATLANTIC CITY: PAST AS PROLOGUE    35 
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THE GAMBLING INDUSTRY 
AS A UNIQUE TOOL OF 
URBAN REDEVELOPMENT
Ultimately, this report cannot definitively 
assess the net impact that legalized gambling has 
had on Atlantic City’s resident population. It is 
not possible to know with certainty how the city 
would have evolved in the absence of gambling 
— whether it would have continued its economic 
decline or whether it would have found another 
path for economic development.  
Moreover, it would be no simple task to 
assess how gambling has affected Atlantic City’s 
residents, particularly because the residential 
population is itself not static. Casino jobs are 
likely to have provided some people living in the 
city at the advent of gambling with avenues of 
economic and residential mobility that eventually 
led to moves out of the city. For Atlantic City’s 
newer immigrant population, casino jobs may have 
provided access to the lower rungs of an economic 
ladder that would otherwise have been unavailable 
to them; they or their children may be able to 
move further up this ladder. A study of economic 
mobility — either past or future — associated with 
gambling is well beyond the scope of the data on 
which this report is based. But given the possibility 
that gambling has provided such opportunities for 
economic mobility, as well as the possibility that in 
the absence of gambling, the city’s decline might 
have continued, the benefits that gambling jobs 
have brought to Atlantic City may well be greater 
than readily available statistical information may 
suggest.  
Nonetheless, to the extent that the vision 
of the gambling industry as a “unique tool of urban 
redevelopment” for Atlantic City encompassed 
the well-being of its resident population and the 
revitalization of its neighborhoods, it is safe to say 
that reality has fallen short of the vision. Poverty 
and unemployment rates are well above the state 
levels, while income is well below.  City residents 
face a dearth of basic retail services. Vacant lots 
and vacant housing are common in some parts of 
the city, overcrowding in other parts.  
This conclusion raises questions for other 
states or cities considering using gambling as a 
tool for either urban redevelopment or for general 
economic development. In particular, could the 
introduction or expansion of the gaming industry 
in a state or city be altered in ways that would be 
more likely to lead to gains in the economic well-
being of households and neighborhoods than what 
has occurred in Atlantic City? As background 
for considering this question, we first explore 
the factors underlying Atlantic City’s labor force 
paradox: many jobs coexisting with high poverty 
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The Labor Force Paradox
Atlantic City has an abundance of easily 
accessible jobs, a high proportion requiring only 
low skill levels, and many unfilled on any given day.
Yet the rates of unemployment and poverty in the 
city are more than double the state level, and the 
percentage of the population that is classified as low 
income is almost 2.5 times higher than in the state 
as a whole. The incidence of these problems is high 
both among population groups drawn by Atlantic 
City’s jobs, especially Hispanics, and among groups 
whose roots in the city are more likely to pre-date 
gambling, i.e., the black and white populations. 
Material presented earlier in this report and 
interviews conducted with Atlantic City residents 
and social service providers suggest a number of 
factors that contribute to this paradox. 127
One factor, suggested in interviews 
conducted with staff at public and nonprofit 
agencies who serve residents in the poorest city 
census tracts, is a lack of the basic work skills 
necessary for employment that makes some area 
residents unable to obtain or maintain a job. 
This lack of “work readiness” is related to limited 
educational achievement, as reflected in low 
high-school graduation rates among the city’s 
youth. (Atlantic City’s graduation rate is about 16 
percentage points lower than the state average,128 
despite per pupil spending that is about $1500 
higher than the state average.) Among the reasons 
cited by these service providers for low graduation 
rates were tensions among different factions of 
young people in Atlantic City; the lure of selling 
drugs; and the stigmatization that sometimes occurs 
127 Interviews conducted for the concentrated poverty case study.
128 New Jersey Department of Education Report Card for the Atlan-
tic City school district, accessed at http://education.state.nj.us/rc/
rc07/dataselect.php?datasectionpercent5B2percent5D=
performance&c=01&d=0110&s=010&lt=A&st=H.
for high-achieving students in low-income areas. 
One provider commented that area students, who 
come directly from their neighborhood elementary 
schools to a high school shared with students from 
more affluent communities outside Atlantic City, 
were unprepared for the competition they faced.129  
In addition, factors specific to the casino 
industry, or to the particular framework within 
which it operates in Atlantic City, may affect the 
ability of those who are “work ready” to obtain or 
maintain a job. The round-the-clock nature of 
casino work may make it difficult for employees with 
children, particularly single parents, to maintain 
a job; those interviewed for the concentrated 
poverty case study frequently cited an absence of 
inexpensive, safe child care that would make it 
easier for parents to work weekend and evening 
shifts. Provisions of New Jersey’s Casino Control 
Act barring individuals with criminal records from 
many casino jobs limit work opportunities for some 
Atlantic City residents.130 Other provisions of the 
act have likely had the effect of limiting noncasino 
work opportunities for those who cannot find or 
maintain work in the casinos. Statistics presented 
in an earlier section of the report indicate that 
private-sector employment outside of casinos has 
fallen considerably since the advent of legalized 
129 In addition, both service providers and residents identified 
aspects of the school program itself that they believed discouraged 
educational achievement.  For example, one service provider com-
mented that the high-school curriculum did not meet the needs 
of the city’s low-income students, while residents believed that 
students would be better able to adjust to high school if, instead of 
the current educational structure, which moves students directly 
from elementary school to high school, there was a middle-school 
program that provided a transition between elementary and high 
school.   
130 These laws once applied to all employees of casinos but were 
relaxed for some categories of workers in 1995. The 2004 annual 
report by Trump Atlantic City Associates states that “requirements 
[related to worker character] have resulted in significant com-
petition among Atlantic City casino operators for the services of 
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gambling. At least some of this loss in noncasino 
employment may be an unintended consequence 
of the requirement in the Casino Control Act that 
gambling be confined to hotels with at least 500 
rooms. As noted earlier, this provision meant that 
gambling operations were large enough to offer 
nongambling services, such as food and beverage 
provision, for their patrons in-house and were thus 
able to supplant other business activity. 
  Finally, residents who hold casino jobs — or 
jobs in other industries — may not earn enough 
to escape poverty or low-income status. As in 
Atlantic City’s days as a beach resort, many of the 
jobs available to residents are low-skill, low-paying 
service-sector positions. Employment seasonality 
also persists to some degree, though it is less severe 
than during the earlier period. Numerous times in 
interviews conducted for the concentrated poverty 
case study, respondents noted that they or someone 
they knew held two or three casino jobs to make 
ends meet.  
That the wages paid by a service-sector in-
dustry with a large share of low-skill jobs are not high 
enough to lift many of its workers out of low-income 
or poverty status should not be surprising, particularly 
when there is a seasonal component to the industry’s 
activity. This was the situation in the heyday of the 
beach resort, and it is the situation with the gambling 
industry today. How and whether incomes for service-
sector workers with low-skill jobs could or should be 
raised through government policies are questions bet-
ter addressed at the state and national level and are 
not discussed further here. Instead, in the next sec-
tion we focus our consideration of labor market out-
comes on the nontrivial part of the prime-age working 
population who have not been successful at finding or 
maintaining steady work or  who have dropped out of 
the labor force altogether.  
Questions for Policymakers Considering 
the Introduction or Expansion of Gaming 
Activity 
  In light of New Jersey’s experience with the 
introduction of casino gambling in Atlantic City, 
policymakers in other states or cities contemplating 
the introduction or expansion of gaming should con-
sider what, if any, changes in the circumstances asso-
ciated with casino development and operation might 
have led to greater improvements in the economic 
well-being of Atlantic City residents and in the qual-
ity of life offered by Atlantic City neighborhoods.  
Among the questions that might be asked are the 
following: 131
	 To what extent would providing a city’s 
residents, particularly low-income 
residents, with more training related to the 
introduction of new casino jobs help reduce 
unemployment and encourage higher levels 
of labor force participation? What types of 
training would be most effective?  Given the 
differences observed in female versus male 
employment in Atlantic City, would more 
emphasis on training programs that serve 
the male population better help this group 
make the adjustment to casino work if other 
sources of employment decline?
131At first glance, these questions might appear to fall into two 
categories, with the first three questions related to improved 
labor-market outcomes and the last two related to better neighbor-
hood outcomes. But improved neighborhood and improved labor 
market outcomes are unlikely to be independent of each other. For 
example, better labor market outcomes and associated increases in 
households’ standard of living would be expected to lead to higher 
household demand for high-quality housing and for public and 
private neighborhood-level services, as well as a higher opportu-
nity cost of criminal activity for individuals that would lessen the 
incidence of neighborhood crime.  Nor are labor market outcomes 
likely to be completely independent of neighborhood-level resourc-
es. Neighborhoods that provide better after-school opportunities, 
for example, may have a lower incidence of youth crime that limits 
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	 To what extent would various types of 
support services increase the likelihood 
that potential workers from low-income 
households and neighborhoods can obtain 
and maintain jobs in the gaming industry? 
For example, would neighborhood-based 
programs that provide youth with more 
alternatives to gang activities decrease 
the percentage of potential workers whose 
criminal records limit their ability to find 
casino work?  Would easier and more 
consistent access to drug rehabilitation 
programs make it possible for more residents 
to find jobs? Would the availability of 
affordable day care that took account of the 
round-the-clock nature of casino work make 
it easier for single parents to maintain their 
jobs?                  
	 To what extent will the legislative 
framework within which the casino industry 
is developed and within which it operates 
have unintended effects on the employment 
opportunities for community residents? As 
has been noted, New Jersey’s Casino Control 
Act mandated extremely strict standards 
for employment in the casinos, while the 
act’s provisions about the size of casino 
hotels were likely a factor in the decline 
in noncasino employment in Atlantic City 
that occurred subsequent to the arrival of 
casinos. On the other hand, the New Jersey 
legislation did not include provisions that 
might have softened the impact of real estate 
speculation on Atlantic City businesses 
and residents; rent increases associated 
with such speculation may have led at least 
some businesses to close.132 At a minimum, 
the Atlantic City experience suggests the 
types of issues that policymakers developing 
a framework for legalized gambling must 
consider before gambling is put into place.  
	 Can gambling-financed redevelopment 
agencies, such as New Jersey’s CRDA, 
be designed to be more effective as tools 
of urban redevelopment? New Jersey’s 
1984 legislation authorizing  the CRDA 
stressed that the CRDA’s mandate was to 
serve the needs of Atlantic City’s low- and 
moderate-income households, but legislative 
amendments, beginning in 1993, allowed 
the CRDA to provide support for casinos 
and, more generally, to use its resources 
for a number of tourist-oriented economic 
development activities not encompassed by 
the initial legislation. An assessment of the 
merits of New Jersey’s legislative changes 
could be helpful for other states and cities in 
deciding whether similar gambling-financed 
agencies will be able to undertake projects 
of a type and at a scale that substantially 
improve the quality of life for residents. 133, 134
132  The loss in well-being from the loss of noncasino businesses 
extends beyond that due to a loss of jobs to encompass a loss in 
consumer choice.
133 Alternatively, one might ask if New Jersey’s legislative changes 
were necessary to maintain the viability of the casino industry.  Giv-
en the flat performance of the Atlantic City casino industry between 
the late 1980s and the early years of the current decade discussed in 
Appendix A, one might hypothesize that CRDA funds were needed 
simply to keep the industry running in place. If so, an argument 
could be made that funds to maintain the industry’s viability indi-
rectly supported city residents who worked in the industry.  
134  In the case of New Jersey, a less obvious question about the 
CRDA’s effectiveness is whether the set of community develop-
ment projects that the agency did support was the most effective 
mix for meeting the needs of its target population.  (The CRDA’s 
initial legislative mandate was quite broad in terms of the activi-
ties it could undertake in support of low- and moderate-income 
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	 To what extent can a state’s gambling  
legislation be designed to encourage better 
coordination among government agencies, 
local residents, and other stakeholders, while 
discouraging corruption, so that tax revenues 
raised by the introduction or expansion of 
gambling are more effective in achieving 
community and economic development 
objectives? As noted earlier, interviews 
about Atlantic City’s development after 
the introduction of casino gambling suggest 
that a lack of coordination among various 
government agencies and local residents 
hindered the city’s ability to use the funds 
that the gambling industry provided as 
effectively as possible. To the extent that this 
is the case, the question is whether other 
states could take steps that might minimize 
such problems without greatly reducing local 
autonomy. If so, they will be better able to 
ensure that the tax revenues provided by 
the introduction or expansion of gambling 
will allow their cities to address problems of 
urban blight and provide improved services 
to their residents while at the same time 
covering the additional municipal costs 
associated with casinos.  
The questions above are prompted by the 
particular circumstances of Atlantic City, but the 
basic issues they raise are by no means new for 
researchers and policymakers concerned with casino 
gambling as a strategy for economic recovery or, 
more generally, with the economic redevelopment 
of depressed communities. The relative uniqueness 
of the Atlantic City situation, however, may give the 
potential researcher the opportunity to delve into 
these questions more deeply.  Such research may 
provide insights applicable to other places about the 
circumstances under which economic development 
activities are most effective in revitalizing 
communities and furthering the well-being of 
community residents.
  Careful consideration of these questions may 
also have real relevance for Atlantic City itself. As 
the next chapter suggests, the development path 
that Atlantic City and its gambling industry will 
follow in the near future is not certain. One vision 
is of an expanded tourist center, with more casinos 
but also with more tourist attractions that appeal to 
the nongambler as well. If such an expansion were 
to occur, some Atlantic City residents fear that it 
would be accompanied by residential displacement, 
as happened during the initial phase of casino 
development. But an expansion would also bring 
additional jobs to the city. A careful examination of 
the past might inform policies that would increase 
the ability of city residents to respond to new job 
opportunities and help the city avoid some of the 
problems that the earlier development period 
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   By many indicators, including number of 
casinos, employment levels, number of visitors, and 
real revenues, the Atlantic City casino industry has 
presented a very constant picture over the past two 
decades.135  It is by no means clear, however, that 
Atlantic City will continue to travel this path, and the 
direction of change, should it move off the path, is also 
uncertain. Recent years have seen the expansion of 
casino and “racino”136 activity to nearby states. Perhaps 
most problematic for the Atlantic City industry are a 
set of racinos (already in place) and planned casinos 
that will stretch along the I-95 corridor where it passes 
through the Philadelphia metropolitan area and may 
provide more easily accessible gambling opportunities 
for many of Atlantic City’s day trippers.
  The Atlantic City casino industry has 
recognized the competitive threat and, over the 
course of the last decade, has taken steps both to limit 
competition and to respond to it. The former category 
included an initiative that used the proceeds of a short-
term tax on net casino income to enhance purses at 
New Jersey’s Meadowlands race track, in return for an 
agreement that the Meadowlands would not introduce 
slot machine gambling for a specified time period.137
135  See Appendix A for a discussion of the performance of the 
casino industry over time.       
136 Racinos are race tracks with slot machines.
137 A detailed description of this initiative is available in Trump 
Atlantic City Associates, Annual Report, 2004.
In the longer term, the city and its gambling 
industry hope to respond to competition via a strategy 
that, if successful, will make Atlantic City a tourist 
destination for a broader spectrum of the population 
than it now attracts. For example, the industry hopes 
to expand the number of nonelderly tourists who visit 
the city and to attract tourists whose interests are less 
narrowly focused on gambling than is the case with 
the current set of visitors.
Within the Atlantic City context, the 
Borgata, the city’s newest casino/hotel, serves as a 
model; the Borgata projects a more glamorous aura 
than do many of the city’s other gambling locations, 
and it has attracted a younger group of tourists. The 
Borgata more closely resembles a Las Vegas casino 
than do the other Atlantic City gambling operations, 
and the broader goal of the city’s casino industry is 
to make Atlantic City more like Las Vegas, where a 
relatively high percentage of tourist dollars are spent 
on nongambling activities such as retail purchases 
and big-name entertainment. Plans for new casino/
hotels offering multiple tourist attractions and the 
development of new upscale retail districts are 
part of this strategy. Through such efforts, casino 
operators hope to avoid losing tourist dollars and, 
indeed, to encourage the typical consumer to stay 
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longer and presumably spend more.138 In the most 
optimistic view, members of the Atlantic City casino 
industry hope that the new casinos in neighboring 
states will themselves expand the customer base for 
Atlantic City gambling: After a taste of gambling at 
stand-alone casinos, a new population will want to 
partake of the full gambling experience that Atlantic 
City provides. 139 
  It is not clear how these efforts to deal with 
new competition will play out. In the short run, 
at least, the industry has faced some problems. In 
late 2006 and early 2007, two racinos opened close 
to the I-95 corridor in Pennsylvania, and in 2007, 
nominal revenues for the Atlantic City casino 
industry as a whole fell for the first time since the 
gambling era began in 1978.140 Construction of new 
Atlantic City casinos that are supposed to help 
counter the competition has stalled because of the 
current problems in credit markets.141 It is not yet 
possible to know whether these are simply temporary 
setbacks in a new development path that will both 
expand and diversify Atlantic City’s tourist sector or 
whether the current situation represents a new long-
term reality for Atlantic City, particularly in light of 
plans for new casinos in the neighboring states of 
Pennsylvania and New York. 
  In a city where the casino industry is so 
138 See the article by Gary Rivlin, who cites Michael Pollock, 
publisher of The Gaming Industry Gazette, on the share of casino 
income from nongaming activity in Las Vegas (59 percent) and 
Atlantic City (10 percent).  The executive director of the Atlantic 
City Convention and Visitors Authority, Jeffrey Vassar, also cited 
in the article, indicates that the average visitor to Las Vegas spends 
three to four days, while the average visitor to Atlantic City spends 
24 hours.
139 See, in particular, the transcript of the committee meeting of the 
New Jersey Senate Wagering, Tourism and Historic Preservation 
Committee, August 2, 2004.    
140 The industry attributes some of this loss to a partial smoking 
ban in casinos that began in 2007 and to fallout from an attempt to 
unionize casino dealers in addition to the new competition.  
141 See the update by Chester Sherman for the New Jersey Depart-
ment of Labor and Workforce Development.
dominant, the industry’s future can be expected 
to have an impact on the well-being of a large part 
of Atlantic City’s resident population.  Although 
gambling has not proved to be a panacea for 
Atlantic City’s problems, the casino industry is by far 
the largest source of jobs for Atlantic City residents 
and the largest source of tax revenues for the city 
and its school district. Should the 2007 decline 
in casino revenues be a harbinger of the future, it 
seems safe to predict a negative impact on the city’s 
population.
  On the other hand, should the industry 
succeed in reinventing itself, predictions about 
the well-being of Atlantic City’s residents become 
more complicated. On the one hand, an expanded 
industry could provide more jobs for residents, 
including, over the short run, a large number 
of construction jobs. The scale of long-term 
employment gains would depend on the industry’s 
commitment to hire local residents, its willingness to 
provide training to potential workers who currently 
lack the skills necessary to obtain or maintain 
employment, and the willingness of the industry 
or the community to provide affordable day-care 
services that would allow more parents to take on 
casino work. To the extent that casino expansion 
is accompanied by an expansion in noncasino-
based tourist attractions, there would also be more 
job opportunities for residents for whom casino 
work is not a viable option. But expansion of the 
casino industry and related industries would also 
have a downside if, as residents fear, it were to be 
accompanied by residential displacement, as during 
Atlantic City’s initial development as a gambling 
resort.  The net benefits and costs to Atlantic 
City’s residents from an expanded industry and the 
distribution of these costs and benefits across the 
resident population would very much depend on 
how the expansion was carried out.ATLANTIC CITY: PAST AS PROLOGUE    43 
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APPENDIX A:  THE ATLANTIC CITY GAMBLING INDUSTRY
I.  Introduction
Following a statewide vote to legalize 
gambling in commercial casinos in Atlantic City 
in 1976 and passage of the Casino Control Act in 
1977, the first of Atlantic City’s casinos opened its 
doors in 1978. Today, Atlantic City has 11 casinos, 
with development of several additional casinos 
planned for the next few years.1 New Jersey was 
the second state, after Nevada, to allow casino 
gambling. Like Las Vegas, Atlantic City is a gambling 
destination, drawing the large majority of its patrons 
from outside its immediate area. 
Although 10 other states have since 
introduced commercial casinos and there has been 
a more general proliferation of gambling facilities, 
including Indian casinos located on tribal lands 
and “racinos” — race tracks with slot machines, 
including several located in Delaware, Pennsylvania, 
and New York — New Jersey has continuously 
ranked second in total revenues brought in by 
commercial casinos, generating $5.2 billion in 2006, 
compared to Nevada’s $12.6 billion that same 
year.2 However, as the development of new gaming 
facilities in New York and Pennsylvania proceeds, 
Atlantic City is feeling competitive pressure, 
and over the past several years, New Jersey has 
taken a number of steps aimed at maintaining its 
competitive position.
This review examines the context in which 
casino gambling has developed and is developing in 
Atlantic City and the performance of the Atlantic 
City casino industry. Section II describes the 
legislative framework within which the industry 
operates. Section III presents data on the pattern of 
1 See the April 2007 article by Suzette Parmley for a discussion of 
plans to expand the number of casinos.
2 Website of the American Gaming Association at http://www.
americangaming.org.
casino development and performance in the 30 years 
since the passage of the Casino Control Act. Section 
IV discusses steps that Atlantic City is taking to 
maintain its competitive position.
II.  Legislative Context
Casino Control Act
 The establishment and operation of casinos 
in Atlantic City is governed by the Casino Control 
Act (CCA), passed in 1977 and since amended 
multiple times. Two prominently stated purposes of 
the legislation indicate the outcomes it is hoped the 
legislation will accomplish, namely, the revitalization 
of Atlantic City’s tourism industry and the use of 
gambling as a “unique tool” to support the city’s 
urban redevelopment.3 
Mark Nichols writes that, in general, the 
CCA provided for an “unusual degree of regulation” 
by the state.4 Much of this regulation was put in 
place to further two “process” goals also laid out in 
the purposes of the act, namely, “maintain[ing] the 
existing tone of the hospitality industry” and using 
strict regulation and control “to maintain and retain 
integrity, public confidence, and trust” in casino 
operations. In support of the first of these goals, 
gaming was restricted to major hotel and convention 
facilities, and in support of the latter, individuals 
with criminal records (or otherwise deemed not to 
be of good character) could not be hired as casino 
workers.5 Arguably, these regulations are particularly 
3 CCA, Article 12-1.
4  See the article by Mark Nichols. 
5 Required size for casino/hotels and licensing of casino employees 
are covered in Article 6 of the CCA. Initially, the hiring restric-
tion applied to all employees working in facilities hosting casinos. 
An amendment to the act in 1995 removed the restriction from 
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important in understanding how the development 
of casinos affected Atlantic City’s existing businesses 
and its residents, a topic considered in the main part 
of this report. Amendments over time have lessened 
regulatory controls.6 Nonetheless, regulation of 
Atlantic City casinos is still viewed by the industry 
as being particularly strict. For example, one casino 
operator stated in 2004 that the strict regulations 
governing the hiring of employees led to competition 
for staff among casinos.7    
Provisions for Public Revenues  
Casinos provide revenues for public purposes 
under several provisions of the Casino Control 
Act, primarily in the form of taxes and fees. These 
revenues can be divided into two categories: those 
going to the state’s Casino Revenue Fund and those 
paid to the Casino Reinvestment Development 
Authority (CRDA), an entity created in 1984 by 
amendment of the act. Taxes paid to the CRDA are 
discussed in the next section, while revenues going 
to the Casino Revenue Fund are discussed here.  
The Casino Revenue Fund (CRF).  The 
Casino Revenue Fund receives the large majority 
of all taxes and fees specified in the Casino Control 
Act. Revenues paid into this fund are dedicated 
to providing assistance to the elderly and disabled. 
The basic gambling tax, and the most important 
revenue source, is an 8 percent tax on adjusted gross 
casino revenues (AGR).8 This rate is at the low 
end for taxes levied by states on casino earnings.9 
Other revenue sources include casino licensing fees; 
slot machine licensing fees; and a $3 tax per car in 
casino parking garages — shared with the CRDA. 
tively low risk in terms of potential for gambling-related corruption.   
6 See the article by Nichols for an interesting discussion of the 
significant increase in casino revenues associated with an increase 
in the amount of casino floor space that could be used for slot 
machines.  
7 Trump Atlantic City Associates, Annual Report, 2004.
8 Adjusted gross revenues are the difference between what a casino 
takes in from gamblers minus what it pays out to them, adjusted for 
bad gambling debts.  
9 Statistics on state tax rates for commercial casinos are available 
from the American Gaming Organization at http://www.
americangaming.org/Industry/state/statistics.cfm.
Beginning in 2004, casinos were also 
required to pay several other taxes,10 including 
a 4.25 percent tax on casino comps, such as 
entertainment, hotel rooms, and food and 
beverages; an additional $3 a day tax for each 
occupied hotel room (whether provided as a 
comp or at a charge);11 an 8 percent tax on gross 
revenues from progressive slot machines; and, 
between 2004 and 2006, a 7.5 percent tax on 
calendar year 2002 adjusted net income.12 (In 
general, the length of time over which the different 
taxes were to be in effect varied; for example, the 
tax on casino comps runs through 2009.) The tax 
on casino comps appears to be designed to capture 
tax revenues that would have been paid on the 
full value of casino-related sales in the absence of 
comps, while funds from the “net income” tax were 
used to help maintain the competitive position of 
Atlantic City’s gambling industry.  (See Section IV 
below.)   
In addition to the taxes described above 
and in the next section, i.e., those that are specific 
to the casino industry and delineated in the 
Casino Control Act, the gambling industry is also 
subject to the full array of state and local taxes 
that any business located in Atlantic City would 
face, including state unemployment insurance 
taxes and local property taxes, while the state’s 
sales tax and hotel tax  are added to the relevant 
expenditures of casino visitors. Given the industry’s 
status as the second largest in New Jersey, and its 
dominant role in Atlantic City, these revenues 
represent a substantial contribution to state and 
local revenues.  (Indeed, casinos pay 80 percent of 
the property taxes going to Atlantic City and its 
school district.13)  Atlantic City also receives funds 
generated by the casinos in the form of a luxury 
sales tax and a tax on promotions.
10 2003 amendments to the Casino Control Act.
11 The relevant legislation stipulated that after 2006, revenues from 
the hotel tax would be shared with the CRDA.
12 Adjusted net income = net income + management fees.  
Adjusted net income is used as a basis for calculating what is ef-
fectively a profits tax because differences in how casinos calculate 
management fees appear to affect reported net income. 
13 Data for 2001, provided in “Atlantic City Gaming Economic 
Impact Report, 2003,” available on the New Jersey Casino Control 
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The Casino Reinvestment Development 
Authority (CRDA)
As initially written, the Casino Control Act 
required that casinos reinvest 2 percent of their 
annual adjusted gross revenues in Atlantic City and 
other parts of New Jersey in projects designed to 
improve the health and well-being of the city and 
state. However, the act provided an alternative to 
this requirement, allowing casinos to hold the money 
otherwise required for reinvestment for five years and 
then pay these funds as a 2 percent tax to the state.14 
As of 1984, the relevant part of the Casino Control 
Act had not resulted in any significant reinvestment 
in Atlantic City.
In response to this situation, the New Jersey 
legislature amended the CCA in 1984 to provide 
for the establishment of the CRDA, whose listed 
purposes include the redevelopment of blighted areas 
and the addressing of pressing social and economic 
needs of residents in Atlantic City and elsewhere 
in the state, with a particular focus on benefits to 
low- and moderate-income households;15 the use of 
funds to support casino development and expansion 
was prohibited.  Under the terms of the legislation, 
the CRDA may issue bonds to finance its projects, 
and casinos are required to use 1.25 percent of their 
adjusted gross revenue (AGR) to buy bonds, to 
invest this amount directly in CRDA projects, or to 
pay a tax equal to 2.5 percent of their AGR to the 
state (over and above the 8 percent tax on AGR).16 
Currently, casinos’ CRDA obligations extend through 
the first 50 years of operation.17 (Table A1 gives the 
legislative requirement for distributing CRDA funds 
across New Jersey over the 50-year period. As of early 
2007, 80 percent of all CRDA-supported spending 
had occurred in Atlantic City.18) 
14 See the article by Rubinstein. 
15  Casino Control Act, Article 12. The actual terms of the require-
ment, laid out in the CCA, 5:12-144b through e, were somewhat 
more complicated, but the basic thrust of the language involved 
the 2 percent reinvestment requirement described in the text. 
16 Not surprisingly, no casino has chosen the last option.   
17 Under the initial authorizing legislation for the CRDA, casinos’ 
CRDA obligation lasted for only 30 years, but in the current de-
cade, as the CRDA’s mandate has been expanded, the length of the 
obligation has been expanded as well, first to 35 years and then to 
the current 50 years, in a bill that also provided legislative approval 
for an expansion of economic development projects.
18 See the article by Serge Kovaleski.
In accordance with the 1984 legislative 
mandate, the CRDA focused its initial efforts on 
the development of for-sale housing, some for low- 
and moderate-income households, especially in 
the blighted North Inlet section of Atlantic City. 
Starting in 1993, however, a series of legislative 
amendments expanded the range of projects that 
the CRDA could fund. In that year, the CRDA was 
specifically directed by the New Jersey legislature 
to provide funding for construction of hotel rooms, 
a reversal of the prohibition on using CRDA funds 
for casino development included in its authorizing 
legislation. Since then, additional legislative changes 
to the relevant section of the Casino Control Act 
have supported an increasingly broad range of 
activities that directly provide funding for casinos 
or for other tourist-oriented development, including 
boardwalk revitalization and entertainment/retail 
districts like the Walk and new retail space at the 
Tropicana. Money from the casino investment 
obligations may be used to support such projects, 
and amendments to the CCA also provide 
supplementary revenue sources, some of them 
temporary, for this purpose. Today, the CRDA’s 
activities are focused on economic development.19
19 As early as 1997, CRDA investments in casino hotel rooms, 
$175 million, were almost as large as its investment in housing, 
$185 million.  (New Jersey Casino Control Commission, Casino 
TABLE A1
Required Disposition of Casinos’ CRDA 
Obligations Across Areas of New Jersey
Each casino’s required 







1-3 100% - -
4-5 90% 8% 2%
6-10 80% 12% 8%
11-15 50% 28% 22%
16-20 30% 43% 27%
21-25 20% 45% 35%
26-30 65% - 35%
31-35 25% 25% 50%
36-50 - 50% 50%
Source: Casino Reinvestment Development Authority, accessible at: http://
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III.  Performance of the Atlantic City 
Casino Industry
The first Atlantic City casino, Resorts, 
opened in 1978 and between 1978 and 1987, the 
number of casinos increased to 12. In subsequent 
years, there were occasional changes in the set of 
casinos in operation, but the number of casinos 
remained at 12 until November 2006, when it fell to 
11. (The most recent changes include the opening 
of the Borgata and the closing of Claridge’s in 2003, 
events that kept the number of casinos at 12, and 
the closing of the Sands in November 2006, the 
source of the drop in the number of casinos.)20 
Casinos’ gross revenues between 1978 and 
2006 are provided in nominal terms in Table A2a 
and in real terms in Table A2b. As noted previously, 
New Jersey has continuously ranked second, after 
Nevada, in total revenues brought in by commercial 
casinos, despite an increase in the number of states 
that have legalized commercial casinos and a more 
general proliferation of gambling facilities, including 
Indian casinos located on tribal lands and “racinos.” 
(Time-series data for the 8 percent gross revenue 
tax paid to the state are also presented in Table 
A2a, while data on taxes paid to Atlantic City and 
Atlantic County are provided in Tables A3a through 
A3c on pages 48 and 49.  Interestingly, while the 
New Jersey casinos rank second in gross revenues, 
they ranked only fifth in tax revenues paid to the 
state in 2006, reflecting the state’s relatively low tax 
rate for gross casino revenues.21) 
Nominal revenue growth in the industry 
was consistently positive through 2006, though in 
any given year, some individual casinos may have 
experienced revenue declines.22 In 2007, nominal 
Gambling in New Jersey: A Report to the National Gambling Impact 
Study Commission, Appendix 4, 1998, available on the commission’s 
website at www.njccc.gov.  Further information on CRDA activities 
is available at www.njcrda.com.)
20 See New Jersey Casino Control Commission Year-End Gaming 
Economic Impact Report, 2003, to track casino entry and exit 
between 1979 and 2000.
21 American Gaming Association at www.americangaming.org.
22 Just as positive growth in nominal revenues for the Atlantic City 
casino industry as a whole may mask a decline in such revenues 
for some casinos, a positive bottom line for the entire industry, as 
represented by net income, may mask net losses for some casinos. 
Although Table A2a shows positive net income for the industry 
between 2003 and 2006, three or more casinos experienced a net 
TABLE A2a
Atlantic City: Casino Revenues, 




































CRDA OBLIGATIONS NET INCOME
2003 $56.0 m. $82.9m.
2004 $60.1 m. $109.5m.
2005 $62.7 m. $548.2m.
2006 $65.2 m. $365.2m.
2007 $61.5 m -$59.7 m
Casinos pay an 8 percent tax on adjusted gross gaming revenue (except in 
the 1978 to 1983 period, when the actual or effective rate varied across 
years). This tax goes to support programs for the elderly and disabled. 
 Casinos must reinvest 1.25 percent of gaming revenues into projects ap-
proved by the CRDA.
Sources:  All numbers from the Casino Control Commission’s  Year-End 
Gaming Economic Impact Reports, 2003-2007, available at www.njccc.gov/
financia/histori.ATLANTIC CITY: PAST AS PROLOGUE    47 
revenues fell for the first time since Resorts opened 
in 1978, a situation that has been attributed to a 
number of factors, including new opportunities for 
slot-machine gambling in Pennsylvania and New 
York, restrictions limiting smoking in Atlantic City’s 
casinos, and fallout from a campaign to unionize 
casino dealers.23 (The Atlantic City industry’s plans 
for responding to new competition in nearby states 
are discussed briefly in this appendix and in the 
concluding chapter of the main text of the report.)  
Moreover, although New Jersey has been 
able to retain its second-place revenue ranking 
in the face of national industry expansion, the 
Atlantic City industry’s performance over time 
has been considerably more stagnant in real terms 
than nominal figures might suggest. Real growth in 
revenues has been relatively slow since 1988, the 
first year in which there were 12 casinos in operation 
over the course of the entire year.24 Between 1988 
and 2006, real growth was 12 percent. (Real growth 
between 1988 and 2002 was only 5.4 percent, while 
real growth between 2002 and 2006 was 6.3 percent. 
The faster growth rate in the second, shorter time 
period probably reflects the 2003 opening of the 
loss in each of these years. See the New Jersey Casino Control 
Commission’s year-end industry impact reports for 2003 through 
2006, which can be accessed at http://www.state.nj.us/casinos/
financia/histori/.
23 See the September 2007 article by Suzette Parmley.
24 While the 12th casino opened in 1987, it did not operate during 
the whole of that year.
Borgata, which offered a more glamorous setting and 
a broader set of nongambling options to its visitors 
than did the older casinos.) For the U.S. as a whole, 
real casino revenues have grown much more quickly: 
53.2 percent between 1995 and 2006.25
Given the low growth rate in real industry 
revenues, it is not surprising to find that the number 
of visitors to the city has also been fairly flat since 
1988. The number of visitors rose from about 7 
million in 1978, the year the first casino opened, to 
about 33 million in 1988.  Between 1988 and 2006, 
the number of visitors to Atlantic City fluctuated 
within a range of about 30 million to about 35 
million26 (Table A4, on page 50). Statistics indicate 
that for most of the 1980s, more than 40 percent 
of visitors arrived by charter bus, suggesting that 
they had come to the city to visit casinos as day-
trippers.27 This group, as a share of all visitors, has 
fallen since the end of the 1980s; the shares were 
about 18 percent and 16 percent in 2006 and 2007, 
respectively. At the same time, the share of visits 
made by automobile, a majority of all visits since the 
opening of the casinos, has increased; it was about 
81 percent in 2007.28 
As in the case of the number of visitors, the 
number of persons employed full time at casinos 
has also been relatively flat since 1988, again 
unsurprising in light of the low rate of growth in real 
revenues. September employment reached a peak at 
about 47,700 in 1990, fell slightly over the beginning 
of the ensuing decade, and grew somewhat at the 
end of the 1990s, reaching a high of about 49,000 
in 1998. In the current decade, employment has 
25 American Gaming Association website at www.americangaming.
org.
26 In fact, by 1986, the 30 million mark had almost been reached 
and was surpassed in 1987. The relatively constant number of 
visitors over time suggests the possibility that the Atlantic City 
industry may have reached a saturation point.
27 Statistics on visitors arriving on casino buses, available for some 
but not all years, support this suggestion. For years for which data 
are available, the number of visitors arriving by charter bus closely 
tracks the number of visitors arriving by casino bus, suggesting that 
a very large majority of the charter buses belong to the “casino 
bus” category. (See the 2006 report from the New Jersey Casino 
Control Commission.) 
28 See the New Jersey Casino Control Commission’s 2006 report. 
While it is likely that many visitors who come by car are also 
day-trippers, it is not possible to speculate on a percentage in the 
context of the current analysis.
TABLE A2b
Real Growth in Casino Revenues1
Atlantic City: Commercial Casinos 
1988-2006 12.0%
        – 1988-2002   5.4%
        – 2002-2006   6.3%
2006-20072  -8.3%
(1995-2006)   5.2%
U.S.:  Commercial Casinos
1995-2006 53.2%
2006-2007   2.4%
1CPI-U index used to convert nominal revenues to real revenues. 
2Real revenues continued to fall in 2008; from the end of 2007 to October 
2008, they had fallen by more than 20 percent.
Source: Table A2a and American Gaming Association, accessed at: http://
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tended to decline. September employment stood 
at 45,409 in 2006.  (See Figure 3 and Table 5 in 
the main text.)  According to the New Jersey 
Department of Labor and Workforce Development, 
the recent drop in employment mirrors an industry-
wide trend29 attributed in part to the adoption of 
labor-saving technology and the substitution of less 
labor-intensive gambling activities (especially slots) 
29 See the New Jersey Department of Labor and Workforce Devel-
opment Atlantic County fact book for 2006.
for more labor-intensive activities (e.g., card games). 
Data from a number of sources indicate 
that a high proportion of casino jobs have relatively 
low skill requirements. For example, a 1998 report 
based on a survey of casino workers indicated that 
11.3 percent had less than a high-school diploma 
and 40.4 percent had graduated from high school 
but had not gone further.  Only 14.8 percent had 
completed four or more years of college.30 The New 
30 This report, “Limitations in the Workforce:  A Survey and Study 
TABLE A3a





Tax rate per $100 
assessed value2
Property taxes 
for city budget 
(millions)
Property taxes 
for city’s school 
budget (millions)
Total city property 
taxes (millions)
% of total sum 
paid by casinos
1977 $308,877  $7.96   N/A  N/A  N/A  -
1978  N/A  N/A $13.70  $4.40  $18.10  9%
1979  N/A  N/A 15.1 5.3 20.4 25%
1980 863,845 4.068 19.5 8.5 28 38%
1981 1,211,515 5.04 39.8 11.8 51.6 46%
1982 1,528,128 4.497 41.3 13.8 55.1 59%
1983 1,549,336 4.32 38.9 14.9 53.8 61%
1984 1,993,629 3.906 44.2 15.4 59.6 62%
1985 2,260,730 3.876 51.6 16.5 68.1 72%
1986 5,563,291 1.967 63.4 17.9 81.3 60%
1987 5,861,132 1.967 69.2 20 89.2 62%
1988 6,290,529 2.072 77.6 22.4 100 64%
1989 6,411,135 2.136 81.1 24.1 105.2 65%
1990 6,409,047 2.2 79.7 32.6 112.3 66%
1991 6,339,118 2.328 83.5 32.8 116.3 68%
1992 6,208,320 2.48 87.4 33.5 120.9 69%
1993 6,140,670 2.497 84.8 38.2 123 70%
1994 6,122,830 2.686 90 42.2 132.2 71%
1995 5,985,350 2.858 96.8 44.8 141.6 64%
1996 6,376,778 2.952 110.1 47.1 157.2 73%
1997 6,359,369 2.949 109.8 48.3 158.1 79%
1998 6,702,420 2.878 108.6 52.3 160.9 80%
1999 6,720,953 2.957 108.6 58.2 166.8 80%
2000 6,692,907 3.09 110.2 62.5 172.7 79%
2001 6,627,000 3.095 106.2 64.5 170.7 80%
2002 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
2003 7,378,212 3.369 N/A N/A N/A 81%
1 Tables A3a and  A3c are drawn, with minor adaptations, from the 2003 New Jersey Casino Gaming Economic Impact Report (year-end report), produced 
by the New Jersey Casino Control Commission.  The commission’s data sources for the information in these tables were the Atlantic City Tax Assessor’s Office 
and the Atlantic County Board of Taxation. Table A3b data and definitions are drawn from the corresponding 2004 report; the commission’s source for Table 
A3b data is the Office of Management and  Budget, NJ Department of Treasury. The 2003 report is the only one in the series in recent years that provides 
detailed information on property taxes paid by the casinos.
2 The numbers provided in this column are a sum of the property tax rates for Atlantic City and Atlantic County.ATLANTIC CITY: PAST AS PROLOGUE    49 
Jersey Department of Labor classifies many of the jobs provided 
by casinos and the hotels in which they are located as low skill31 
(Table A5).
Such sources also indicate that a high percentage 
of casino jobs are low paying. For example, the New Jersey 
Department of Labor reported an average annual wage of 
$28,840 (including tips) for the Atlantic County hospitality 
industry, 72 percent of whose jobs are provided by the casino 
industry.32  This report notes that “[I]nterestingly, leisure and 
hospitality is the only sector where Atlantic County’s average 
wage exceeded the statewide average…in 2004…[This] can be 
traced to the gaming industry’s unionized hotel and restaurant 
workers, higher tipping rates and a greater proportion of higher-
paying jobs compared to similar non-gaming establishments.” 
Table A5 provides information on 2004 wages in specific casino 
occupations.  (Information on the distribution of wages in an 
earlier period is available for workers surveyed in winter 1997-98 
for the 1998 Rutgers report.33 See Figure A1, on page 51. The 
authors note that workers reporting wages below $5 per hour 
worked in those casino jobs where income was most likely to be 
substantially increased by tips; for most other workers, wages 
ranged between $7 and $13 per hour, translating to a range of 
about $14,500 to $27,040 for full-time year-round employment. ) 
Finally, data from the 1998 Rutgers report indicate that 
minority workers held about 46 percent of casino jobs in 1977 
and that women held about 47 percent of jobs. Data from the 
Casino Control Commission from 1996 indicate that minority 
employees were disproportionately concentrated in low-skill 
occupations, however, and that both women and minorities were 
underrepresented among employees earning more than $35,000 
per year; this underrepresentation is particularly striking for 
minority workers.34
  
IV.  Dealing with Competition from Expansion of 
Gambling Activity in Neighboring States
  By many indicators, including number of casinos, 
employment levels, number of visitors, and real revenues, the 
of Atlantic City Casinos,” prepared by Rutgers University for the Casino Control 
Commission, was based on a survey of all casino workers conducted during 1997 
and 1998 that had a 78 percent response rate.
31 See the New Jersey Department of Labor and Workforce Development Atlantic 
County fact book for 2006.
32 See the New Jersey Department of Labor and Workforce Development Atlantic 
County fact book for 2006.
33 Data were collected at one casino in October 1997; for all other casinos, data 
were collected between December 1997 and February 1998.
34 See the Rutgers University report, op. cit.
TABLE A3b 
Other Atlantic CityTax 
Revenues Received from Casinos, 
2003
Luxury Tax1 (in millions) $18.2
Promo Tax2 (in millions) 9.4
Parking Tax (in millions) 20.7
1 Luxury tax rates are 3 percent on sales of alcoholic 
beverages and 9 percent on other taxable items, e.g., 
beach chairs.
2 Promotional (“promo”) taxes are $2 per day fees 
for each occupied room in hotels that provide casino 
gambling and $1 per day for each occupied room in 
other lodging places.
TABLE A3c
Property Taxes for Atlantic County, 






% of total 
paid by 
casinos
1978  $25.2 2%
1979  15.3 6%
1980  24.7 11%
1981  29.6 15%
1982  34.9 23%
1983  37.7 21%
1984  40.9 28%
1985  46.4 31%
1986  57.2 30%
1987  57.1 28%
1988  63.3 30%
1989  70.4 29%
1990  68.9 28%
1991  78.7 27%
1992  83.9 27%
1993  85.1 25%
1994  88.2 26%
1995  85.5 22%
1996  86.2 26%
1997  86.3 27%
1998  83.1 30%
1999  85.2 30%
2000 86.9 29.5%
2001 91.6 28.7%50    ATLANTIC CITY: PAST AS PROLOGUE
Atlantic City casino industry has presented a very 
constant picture over the past two decades.  It is 
by no means clear, however, that Atlantic City 
will continue to travel this path, and the direction 
of change, should it move off the path, is also 
uncertain. Recent years have seen the expansion of 
casino and racino35 activity to nearby states. Perhaps 
most problematic for the Atlantic City industry are a 
set of racinos (already in place) and planned casinos 
that will stretch along the I-95 corridor where it 
35 Racinos are race tracks with slot machines.
passes through the Philadelphia metropolitan area 
and may provide a more easily accessible gambling 
opportunity for many of Atlantic City’s day-trippers.
  The Atlantic City casino industry has 
recognized the competitive threat and, over the 
course of the last decade, has taken steps both 
to limit competition and to respond to it. In the 
former category was an initiative that used the 
proceeds of a short-term tax on net adjusted 
casino income to enhance purses at New Jersey’s 
Meadowlands racetrack, in return for an agreement 
that the Meadowlands would not introduce slot 
machine gambling for a specified time period. In 
the long term, the city and its gambling industry 
hope to respond to competition via a strategy 
that, if successful, will make Atlantic City a tourist 
destination for a broader spectrum of the population 
than it now attracts. For example, the industry 
hopes to expand the number of nonelderly tourists 
who visit the city and to attract tourists whose 
TABLE A4




% of visitors coming 
by charter bus
% of visitors 
coming by car
1980 13,822 23.9% 71.6%
1981 19,084 35.5 60.1
1982 22,955 39.4 57.0
1983 26,361 41.9 54.4
1984 28,466 42.3 54.3
1985 29,326 42.9 53.5
1986 29,932 41.6 54.7
1987 31,845 42.4 54.1
1988 33,138 42.8 53.6
1989 32,002 38.9 57.0
1990 31,813 35.2 60.7
1991 30,788 33.4 62.6
1992 30,705 31.8 64.3
1993 30,225 28.9 67.2
1994 31,321 26.7 69.6
1995 33,272 27.3 69.6
1996 34,042 29.4 67.6
1997 34,070 28.3 68.6
1998 34,300 28.9 67.9
1999 33,652 27.8 69.1
2000 33,184 27.2 69.8
2001 32,423 24.6 72.5
2002 33,187 22.9 74.4
2003 32,224 21.0 76.2
2004 33,313 19.7 77.5
2005 34,924 17.5 79.9
2006 34,534 17.5 79.8
2007 33,300 16.2 80.9
Source: New Jersey Casino Control Commission, Economic Impact Report, 





Wages and Skill Levels for a 





Gaming Dealers $ 15,090 Moderate
Waiters and Waitresses 16,930 Low
Cashiers 17,480 Low
Retail Salespersons 23,880 Low
Gaming Change Persons and Booth 
Cashiers 22,210 Low
Combined Food Preparation and Serving 
Workers, Including Fast Food 16,480 Low
Janitors and Cleaning, Except Maids and 
Housekeeping Cleaners 23,210 Low
Security Guards 23,810 Low
Office Clerks, General 24,900 Low
Maids and Housekeeping Cleaners 19,580 Low
Gaming Supervisors 47,350 Moderate
Dishwashers 18,330 Low
Food Preparation Workers 19,100 Low
Bartenders 23,650 Low
Electricians 54,060 Moderate
Supervisors/Managers of Retail Sales 
Workers
41,690 Moderate
Stock Clerks and Order Fillers 21,650 Low
Cooks, Restaurant 26,510 Moderate
Source: 2006 Atlantic County fact book.ATLANTIC CITY: PAST AS PROLOGUE    51 
interests are less narrowly focused on gambling 
than is the case with the current set of visitors. 
Within the Atlantic City context, the Borgata, the 
city’s newest casino/hotel, serves as a model; the 
Borgata projects a more glamorous aura than do 
many of the city’s other gambling locations, and it 
has attracted a younger tourist group. The Borgata 
more closely resembles a Las Vegas casino than do 
the other Atlantic City gambling operations, and 
the broader goal of the city’s casino industry is to 
make Atlantic City more like Las Vegas, where 
a relatively high percentage of tourist dollars are 
spent on nongambling activities such as retail 
purchases and big-name entertainment. Plans 
for new casino/hotels offering multiple tourist 
attractions and the development of new upscale 
retail districts are part of this strategy. Through 
such efforts, casino operators hope to avoid losing 
tourist dollars and, indeed, to encourage the typical 
consumer to stay longer and presumably spend 
more.36 In the most optimistic view, members of the 
36 See the article by Gary Rivlin, who cites Michael Pollock, 
Atlantic City casino industry hope that 
the new casinos in neighboring states will 
themselves expand the customer base for 
Atlantic City gambling: After a taste of 
gambling at stand-alone casinos, a new 
population will want to experience the 
full gambling experience that Atlantic 
City provides.37 
     It is not clear how these efforts to 
deal with new competition will play out. 
In the short run, at least, the industry 
has faced some problems. In late 2006 
and early 2007, two racinos opened close 
to the I-95 corridor in Pennsylvania, 
and in 2007, nominal revenues for the 
Atlantic City casino industry as a whole 
fell for the first time since the gambling 
era began in 1978.38 Construction of new 
Atlantic City casinos that are supposed 
to help counter the competition has 
stalled because of the current problems in 
credit markets.39 It is not yet possible to 
know whether these are simply temporary 
setbacks in a new development path that 
will both expand and diversify Atlantic 
City’s tourist sector or whether the current 
situation represents a new long-term reality for 
Atlantic City. 
 
publisher of The Gaming Industry Gazette, on the share of casino 
income from nongaming activity in Las Vegas (59 percent) and 
Atlantic City (10 percent).  The executive director of the Atlantic 
City Convention and Visitors Authority, Jeffrey Vassar, also cited in 
the article, notes that the average visitor to Las Vegas spends three 
to four days, while the average visitor to Atlantic City spends 24 
hours.  
37 See, in particular, the transcript of the committee meeting of the 
New Jersey Senate Wagering, Tourism and Historic Preservation 
Committee, August 2, 2004 for a discussion of the possible impacts 
of new competition and of ways that the Atlantic City industry 
might respond.
38 The industry attributes some of this loss to a partial smoking 
ban in casinos that began in 2007 and fallout from a campaign to 
unionize casino dealers in addition to the new competition.  
39 See the update by Chester Sherman of the New Jersey Depart-
ment of Labor and Workforce Development.
This figure is reproduced from the Bureau of Economic Research, Rutgers Univer-
sity, report cited in the references. (Data were collected at one casino in October 
1997; for all other casinos, data were collected between December 1997 and 
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APPENDIX B:  ATLANTIC COUNTY IN THE POST-CASINO ERA
I.  Introduction
The main text of this report focuses on 
economic and demographic trends in Atlantic City 
since the arrival of legalized gambling in 1978. But 
one would not expect the casino industry’s effects 
to be confined to the city alone. Newcomers drawn 
to the Atlantic City area by casino jobs would 
not necessarily live in the city proper, so their 
arrival might have implications for the size and 
characteristics of the population in nearby areas. 
Income going to households that supply labor, and 
to businesses that supply goods and services to the 
casino industry, would not all be spent in the city 
itself; income spent in other places would generate 
new economic activity in those places.1 In short, 
the effects of the casino industry would be expected 
to spill over to neighboring areas.
This appendix looks at economic and 
demographic change in the region surrounding 
Atlantic City over the past several decades. In 
other research that looks at regional change 
subsequent to casino openings, the county in 
which the casino is located is commonly used as 
the unit of analysis. That is the approach taken in 
this appendix, which looks at trends in Atlantic 
County, Atlantic City’s home county. The next 
section provides a statistical picture of the county, 
pre- and post-casino, and the one that follows 
focuses on the growth of noncasino employment in 
recent decades.    
1 All other things equal, the degree to which money received by 
households and businesses from the casino industry is spent outside 
the casino jurisdiction would be expected to depend on the extent 
to which these households and businesses were located outside the 
jurisdiction.
II.  Statistical Picture of Atlantic City 
and the Balance of Atlantic County
Tables B1 and B2 provide data on 
demographic and economic trends in Atlantic 
County, Atlantic City, the balance of Atlantic 
County (“county balance”), and the state of New 
Jersey.  Discussion in this section focuses, for the 
most part, on the comparison of Atlantic City and 
the county balance before and after the advent 
of legalized gambling, although some countywide 
data are also discussed. The decision to focus 
on these sub-areas rather than the county as a 
whole is based on the very different economic 
and demographic characteristics of the sub-areas.  
Countywide statistics would lie between city and 
county balance numbers but would not do a good 
job of describing either. 
The Picture in 1970
In 1970, the last decennial census year prior 
to casino development, the city and the balance of 
Atlantic County presented very different statistical 
profiles. Atlantic City, clearly in decline, had lost 20 
percent of its population since 1960 and 6 percent 
of its private-sector jobs since 1965. In contrast, the 
balance of the county had experienced a 26 percent 
increase in population since 1960 and a 40 percent 
increase in private-sector jobs since 1965.2 The 
gains in the balance of the county were too large to 
simply reflect a suburbanization of population and 
employment within the metropolitan area, and on 
2 Unless otherwise noted, in this appendix, the term “employment” 
refers to private-sector “covered employment,” which is employ-
ment covered by unemployment and temporary disability benefit 
laws. Data on such employment are available from the New Jersey 
Department of Labor and Workforce Development’s publications 
and website. The underlying data for calculating these changes are 
available from the author on request.54    ATLANTIC CITY: PAST AS PROLOGUE
net, the county as a whole 
experienced population and 
job growth.
Demographically, 
Atlantic City and the balance 
of Atlantic County looked 
very different as well. (With 
a few exceptions, noted 
below, the demographic 
characteristics of the balance 
of the county were quite 
similar to those of the state 
as a whole.) In the city, 46 
percent of the population 
was nonwhite, while in the 
balance of the county the 
minority percentage was 8 
percent. The foreign-born 
comprised 9 percent of the 
city’s population and only 5 
percent of the population in 
the county balance. Twenty-
five percent of Atlantic 
City’s population was elderly, 
compared to 13 percent in 
the remainder of the county. 
(This latter percentage was 
nonetheless considerably 
higher than the corresponding 
percentage for the state. See 
Table B1.) Not surprisingly 
given the difference in shares 
of elderly, the share of the 
population that was of prime 
working age — between 25 
and 64 years of age — was 
somewhat higher in the 
balance of the county than 
in the city. The share of 
households that were families 
was considerably lower in the 
city than in the balance of 
the county (60 percent vs. 
82 percent), while the share of families classified 
as female-headed with children was considerably 
higher (16 percent vs. 5 percent).  The level of 
educational achievement was lower in the city 
than in the balance of the county.3  However, the 
balance of the county lagged the state somewhat in 
3 The higher percentage of city residents who were elderly probably 
contributes, in part, to the lower educational attainment.
TABLE B1
Selected Demographic Trends for Atlantic City, Atlantic County, County 
Balance, and New Jersey
Population 1970 1980 1990 2000
City 47,859 40,199 37,986 40,517
Balance 127,184 153,920 186,341 212,035
County 175,043 194,119 224,327 252,552
New Jersey 7,168,164 7,364,823 7,730,188 8,414,350
% change in 
population
1960- 1970 1970-1980 1980-1990 1990-2000
City -19.6% -16.0% -5.5% 6.7%
Balance 25.5% 21.0% 21.1% 13.8%
County 8.8% 10.1% 15.6% 12.6%
New Jersey 18.2% 2.7% 5.0% 8.9%
1970 1980 1990 2000
% elderly
City 24.8% 23.5% 19.2% 14.2%
Balance 12.9% 13.9% 13.6% 13.5%
County 16.2% 15.9% 14.5% 13.6%
New Jersey 9.7% 11.6% 13.4% 13.2%
% 25-64        
City 41.6% 41.9% 47.8% 51.2%
Balance 45.4% 47.3% 52.9% 53.4%
County 44.4% 46.1% 52.1% 53.0%
New Jersey 46.8% 49.5% 53.3% 53.9%
% foreign-born*        
City 9.4% 7.7% 9.9% 24.7%
Balance 5.4% 4.7% 4.9% 9.3%
County 6.5% 5.3% 5.8% 11.8%
New Jersey 8.9% 10.3% 12.5% 17.6%
% of households 
that are families
City 59.6% 54.8% 52.0% 54.9%
Balance 81.9% 73.6% 69.7% 68.8%
County 74.7% 69.3% 66.5% 66.5%
New Jersey 82.7% 72.6% 72.3% 70.3%
Table continued on next page Source: U.S. Decennial Censuses
*Percent of foreign-born arriving after 1990: City 65.4%, Balance 45.4%, County 52.1%, New Jersey 41.6%.ATLANTIC CITY: PAST AS PROLOGUE    55 
the percentages of the population over 25 with high-
school diplomas and college degrees. 
Economically, the balance of the county, 
while considerably better off than the city, lagged 
the state on key measures of household well-being, 
such as household and family median income and 
unemployment.4 (In addition, male 
and female labor force participation 
rates were slightly lower than those of 
the state.) However, the balance of the 
county had a lower poverty rate than the 
state as a whole.  
 Post-Casino Patterns
Overall Trends in Population 
and Employment. Atlantic County’s 
population has grown quickly since 
the advent of casinos. Between 1970 
and 2005, population increased 54.8 
percent, much higher than the statewide 
population increase of 21.6 percent; the 
county ranked seventh among all New 
Jersey counties in population growth. 
For all intents and purposes, all of this 
growth occurred in the balance of the 
county, where population increased 81 
percent between 1970 and 2005.5  
Between 1970 and 2005, the 
number of private-sector “covered 
employment” jobs in Atlantic County 
grew 147 percent, a percentage much 
higher than the 60 percent growth in the 
state as a whole. (See Figure B1, on page 
57, which graphically depicts growth of 
covered employment over the period.6)  
The sharpest growth occurred between 
1978 and 1990. Casino employment 
was rising during this period (Figure B2, 
on page 58), and construction activity 
in Atlantic City also tended to be high 
as the casino industry grew to its long-
term number of 12 casinos. (During this 
period, the building of CRDA-sponsored 
housing on a large scale also added 
to construction activity.)  Positive job 
growth in the balance of the county 
4 The higher level of unemployment was probably due in part to the 
seasonal nature of much of Atlantic County’s employment.
5 Statistics in this paragraph are drawn or derived from material 
in the New Jersey Department of Labor and Workforce Develop-
ment’s 2006 Atlantic County fact book. 
6 Data on employment broken out for the city and balance of the 
county are not available for all years.
TABLE B1 Continued 
1970 1980 1990 2000
% of families female 
headed with children under 18        
City 15.7% 23.3% 29.8% 25.5%
Balance 5.3% 7.9% 9.5% 10.4%
County 8.0% 10.8% 12.5% 12.5%
New Jersey 5.6% 8.7% 9.5% 9.1%
% with a H.S. diploma        
City 35.4% 48.1% 58.3% 61.8%
Balance 48.2% 65.1% 75.9% 81.2%
County 44.4% 61.4% 72.9% 78.2%
New Jersey 52.5% 67.4% 76.7% 82.1%
% with a college degree        
City 3.4% 7.7% 9.5% 10.4%
Balance 7.3% 13.8% 17.8% 20.2%
County 6.2% 12.5% 16.4% 18.7%
New Jersey 11.8% 18.3% 24.9% 29.8%
% White        
City 54.6% 43.9% 30.8% 19.4%
Balance 92.2% 86.8% 82.4% 72.4%
County 81.9% 77.9% 73.7% 68.4%
New Jersey 88.8% 79.3% 74.0% 66.0%
% Black        
City 43.7% 49.3% 49.7% 42.4%
Balance 7.4% 9.0% 10.1% 12.0%
County 17.4% 17.3% 16.8% 17.6%
New Jersey 10.7% 12.3% 12.7% 13.0%
% Hispanic        
City NA 5.8% 15.3% 24.9%
Balance NA 3.4% 5.5% 9.7%
County NA 3.9% 7.2% 12.2%
New Jersey NA 6.7% 9.6% 13.3%
% Asian        
City NA 0.6% 3.7% 10.0%
Balance NA 0.5% 1.7% 4.0%
County NA 0.5% 2.0% 5.1%
New Jersey NA   3.4% 5.7%
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TABLE B2
Selected Economic Indicators for Atlantic City, Atlantic County, the County Balance, and New Jersey
1970 1980 1990 2000
Private-Sector Total Covered Employment*
City 25,069  36,406   66,000   60,500** 
Balance 26,512  40,522  54,300  63,400
County 51,581  76,928  120,298  123,929 
New Jersey   2,095,798  2,530,556  3,036,932  3,283,702 
Median Income        
Household        
City 4,257  9,807  20,309  26,969 
Balance 8,236   15,000-20,000   35,000-37,500   45,000-50,000 
County 6,819  15,752  33,716  43,933 
New Jersey 10,371  19,800  40,927  55,146 
Family        
City 6,395  13,238  27,804  31,997 
Balance 9,595   20,000-25,000***   42,500-45,000***   50,000-60,000*** 
County 8,775  19,216  40,602  51,710 
New Jersey 11,403  22,906  47,589  65,370 
Poverty Rate        
City 22.5% 24.9% 25.0% 23.6%
Balance 9.5% 9.4% 6.2% 8.0%
County 13.0% 12.6% 9.4% 10.5%
New Jersey 11.3% 9.5% 7.6% 8.5%
% Poor/Near Poor1        
City NA 32.4% 30.8% 30.3%
Balance NA 13.6%*** 8.7% 11.0%
County NA 17.4% 12.5% 14.1%
New Jersey NA 12.9% 10.3% 11.2%
% Low Income2        
City NA 52.4% 45.8% 49.9%
Balance NA 28.3%*** 18.3% 22.9%
County NA 33.2% 23.0% 27.2%
New Jersey NA 24.3% 16.3% 20.4%
further added to the number of county jobs.
Subsequent to 1990, casino employment 
leveled off and, more recently, has started to 
decline. The number of noncasino private-sector 
jobs in Atlantic City proper declined after 1990 
(although there has been an uptick in such jobs in 
recent years), but the number of jobs in the balance 
of the county continued to grow. The net effect 
was a continued, albeit slower, growth in Atlantic 
County jobs.  (A further discussion of the impact of 
casinos on overall economic growth in the county is 
contained in the next section of this appendix.)   
Demographic Trends in the City and in 
the County Balance.  Both Atlantic City and the 
remainder of Atlantic County have experienced 
demographic change since the advent of the casino 
era. But as was the case in 1970, demographic 
characteristics of the two areas continue to differ 
sharply on most measures.  
While the nonwhite share of the population 
has grown in both the city and the balance of the 
county, Atlantic County is still quite predominantly 
white, while the city is very predominantly minority 
(72 percent white in the balance of the county vs. 
19 percent white in the city). Hispanic and Asian 
population shares in the city are about 2.5 times 
higher in the city than in the balance of the county, ATLANTIC CITY: PAST AS PROLOGUE    57 
and the city’s black share is about 
3.5 times higher. The share of the 
population that is foreign-born 
has grown much more quickly in 
the city than in the balance of the 
county; in 2000, this share was 
25 percent for the city but only 
9 percent for the balance of the 
county, whose share was lower 
than the corresponding 18 percent 
share for the state as a whole.  
Among the foreign-born, the 
share that arrived in the U.S. after 
1990 is considerably higher in the 
city than in the rest of the county, 
65 percent vs. 45 percent. (The 
corresponding share of “recent 
arrivals” among the foreign-born 
population in the state as a whole 
is 42 percent.)
Over time, the shares of 
the population that are elderly 
in the city and in the remainder 
of the county have converged, 
the result of a large drop in the 
city share and a small increase 
in the county balance share. 
During this period, the share 
of the state population that is 
elderly has grown so that there 
is now little difference between 
Atlantic County and the state on 
this measure. Over the period, 
the share of the population that 
is prime working age has grown 
in the city, the balance of the 
county, and the state; again, there 
is now little difference in share 
among these areas. The share 
of households that are families 
has declined since 1970 in both 
the city and the balance of the 
county,7 but the share continues 
to be substantially higher in the 
7 While share of city households that are 
families was lower in 2000 than in 1970, 
the percentage actually increased slightly 
between 1990 and 2000.
* “Covered employment” is employment covered by unemployment and temporary disability 
benefits laws.  
**Data on covered employment are not available for 2000 for city and county balance. All covered 
employment data reported in this column are for 1999.
***Values and ranges estimated on the basis of reported census data.
Sources:  Decennial Censuses, New Jersey Department of Labor and Workforce Development Series 
on Covered Employment.  
1 “Near poor” is defined in a footnote to Table 8 on page 25.
2“Low-income” is defined in a footnote to Table 8 on page 25.
TABLE B2 Continued
Unemployment Rate
Male        
City 8.8% 10.3% 10.1% 15.2%
Balance 3.5% 7.3% 4.7% 7.5%
County 4.8% 7.8% 5.5% 8.6%
New Jersey 2.3% 6.1% 5.0% 5.7%
Female        
City 8.9% 12.0% 9.2% 10.3%
Balance 6.2% 8.5% 4.8% 5.6%
County 7.1% 9.2% 5.5% 6.3%
New Jersey 4.6% 7.3% 5.1% 5.9%
LFPR (Male/Female)        
City 64.7/40.7% 64.0/47.4% 70.7/54.0% 61.6/52.4%
Balance 75.9/41.2% 75.7/50.5% 78.1/60.5% 72.2/60.3%
County 72.8/41.1% 73.4/49.8% 76.9/59.4% 70.5/59.1%
New Jersey 79.6/42.5% 76.6/50.6% 76.2/58.6% 71.6/57.5%
Source:  All data from New Jersey Department of Labor and Workforce  (NJDLW) series on covered 
employment.  County-level data collected from department publications (before 1990) and website 
(from 1990). City-level data:   1960-1975, collected from Sternlieb and Hughes, p. 178, Table 5; 
1976 to 1993, collected from Hamer (1995), Table 4; 1998 to 1999 and 2003 to 2006 provided by 
William Saley at NJDLW. City-level data are not available in tabulated form for 1994 through 1997 
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balance of the county, which looks 
like New Jersey as a whole on this 
characteristic. The share of families 
who are female-headed with children 
under 18 grew between 1970 and 
2000 in both areas and in the state, 
but as in the pre-casino era, this share 
is still considerably higher in the city 
than in the balance of the county and 
the state.
Over time, the level of 
academic achievement has grown in 
the city, the balance, and the state.  
In 2000, the share of population over 
25 in the balance of the county who 
had a high-school diploma was about 
the same as in the state as a whole, 
while the city lagged the state by 
about 20 percentage points. Both the 
city and the balance lagged the state 
considerably in the percentage of the 
population over 25 with a college 
degree.
Trends in the Economic Well-Being of 
Atlantic County Residents. In the post-casino years, 
Atlantic City has continued to lag both the county 
balance and the state as a whole on measures of 
economic well-being; the county balance has itself 
lagged the state on a number of income-related 
indicators8 (Table B2).  Median family and household 
incomes were lower in the county balance than in the 
state in both 1990 and 2000.9 Although the county 
balance poverty rate has been lower than that of the 
state in each of the three post-casino census years, the 
8 Measures of other indicators of economic well-being for the 
county balance show a mixed picture in comparison to the state. 
The male unemployment rate was higher than that of the state 
in two of the three post-casino census years covered by Table B2; 
however, the female unemployment rate was lower than the state’s 
rate in two out of these three years.  Male and female labor force 
participation rates were somewhat lower than those for the state in 
1980, but somewhat higher in the next two decennial census years.  
9 Median household and family income in 1980 cannot be pinpoint-
ed closely enough to make a comparison with state medians. The 
2006 Atlantic County fact book provides additional information 
on the income gap between the county as a whole and the state for 
2004. According to this source, the average private-sector wage in 
Atlantic County that year was only 70 percent of the corresponding 
average for the state and the county’s per capita personal income 
was only 78.2 percent that of the state’s.
percentage of the population classified as low income 
has been a bit higher.10 The high proportion — almost 
40 percent — of Atlantic County jobs located in 
the low-paying leisure/hospitality sector is one factor 
contributing to a tendency for incomes in both the 
city and the county balance to be lower than those 
in the state.11 In addition, average county wages are 
lower than average state wages in all sectors except 
leisure/hospitality12(Figure B3). The bottom line 
seems to be that while the casinos have expanded the 
level of economic activity in Atlantic County, they 
have not changed the overall character of economic 
activity sufficiently to close the income gap between 
the county and the rest of the state. 
10 As in the main text, an individual is defined as low income if he 
or she lives in a household whose income is less than 200 percent 
of the relevant poverty line.
11 See p. 5 of the 2006 Atlantic County fact book.   
12 See the 2006 Atlantic County fact book. The higher wage in the 
Atlantic County leisure/hospitality sector compared to the rest of 
the state is attributed to unionization of casino employees, higher 
tip levels in the casinos, and a greater share of relatively high-
paying jobs in the casinos than in other parts of the sector (p. 7). 
While the average county wage in the leisure/hospitality sector is 
higher than the corresponding state average, the average county 
wage in this sector is still low compared to wages in other sectors.  
Source: Data on casino employment come from the New Jersey Department of Labor and 
Workforce’s Nonfarm Payroll Employment Time Series and from Hamer, Table 4, which also 
uses this source. All casino employment is “covered employment.” Noncasino employment is 
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III.  Growth in the Noncasino 
Sector During the Casino Era 
This section examines employment 
growth in the noncasino sector since the arrival of 
casino gambling. Figures B1 and B2 show that the 
establishment of the casino industry shifted up the 
overall number of private-sector jobs in Atlantic 
County; they also show that noncasino employment 
in the county was growing prior to the arrival of 
casinos and that it continued to grow after the 
major period of casino expansion. However, the 
impact of the casino industry on noncasino private-
sector employment cannot be so easily discerned 
on the basis of these graphs.  Although a full-scale 
investigation of this impact is well beyond the 
scope of this report, we make some preliminary 
observations in the context of the report.  
In Figure B2, a best-fit exponential 
trend curve is superimposed on the graphical 
representation of noncasino private employment. 
This curve, which illustrates an annual growth rate 
in jobs of about 1.5 percent, fits the actual “jobs 
path” quite well. The exception is the period from 
1978 to 1990, when the number of private-sector 
jobs rises well above the trend line. This is the period 
in which the number of casinos grew from zero to 
their long-term level of 12 and when the CRDA was 
supporting residential construction on a large scale; 
time-series data on 
construction jobs 
in Atlantic County 
provide support for 
the hypothesis that 
construction activity 
is a key factor in the 
rise of employment 
above the trend 
line.13 One would 
not expect this level 




complete, and after 
1990, actual job 
growth moves back 
to the long-term 
trend path.
However, while the long-term Atlantic 
County growth trend is quite pronounced, it is not 
easy to predict how the arrival of casinos affected 
the location of the trend line, particularly because 
of the situation in Atlantic County prior to the 
arrival of casinos: Atlantic County was neither a 
rural county with relatively little economic activity, 
nor was it a place where the full county shared 
a common growth pattern. Rather, in Atlantic 
City proper, a previously developed economy was 
failing (and we do not know the extent to which 
city employment would have continued to decline 
in the absence of the casinos), while at the same 
time, the remainder of the county was experiencing 
considerable economic growth.  
Nonetheless, it is not unreasonable to 
believe that the casino industry increased the 
number of private-sector jobs above the level that 
it would have been otherwise. Atlantic County 
population grew by about 30,000 between 1980 
and 1990, compared to increases of about 14,000 
between 1960 and 1970, and 19,000 between 1970 
and 1980. It is likely that many of the newcomers 
in the 1980s came in response to the availability 
of new casino jobs. (Data in Table B3 show that in 
13  Construction data are available from the New Jersey Department 
of Labor and Workforce Development publications (prior to 1990) 
and from the department’s website thereafter.
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1990, county residents held almost 35,000, or about 
72 percent of casino jobs.) Firms that provided 
goods and services for these new households would 
have added to county employment.  In addition, 
Atlantic County firms were the vendors for a large 
share of casino industry purchases.14 Since it is 
14 Data on Atlantic County businesses’ share of purchases, available 
from the late 1980s onward, indicate that this share has typically 
ranged between about 40 and 50 percent of all purchases. For ex-
ample, in 1989, county businesses had a 53 percent share of $1.8 bil-
lion in purchases; in 1992, they had a 47 percent share of $1.9 billion 
in purchases; and in 1996, they had a 39 percent share of $1.5 billion 
in purchases. In 2003, county businesses had a 51 percent share of 
$3.1 billion in purchases, while in 2007 they had a 40 percent share 
of $4.04 billion in purchases. See the New Jersey Casino Control 
Commission’s year-end Economic Impact Reports for 2003 and 2007, 
the commission’s annual reports for 1989 and 1992, and the commis-
sion’s report to the National Gambling Impact Study Commission. 
likely that casino-generated business increased, 
rather than simply replaced, business activity that 
would otherwise have taken place, one would 
expect the casino purchases to have generated job 
growth. Given these factors, it seems likely that the 
establishment of the casino industry led to higher 
long-term sustainable noncasino job growth during 
the 1980s than would have otherwise been the 
case, even given the possibility that the casinos 
supplanted some jobs in Atlantic City proper. (See 
main text, pages 19-20.) 
The casino industry had essentially plateaued 
by 1991, with the number of casino jobs stagnating 
and eventually declining in the years that followed. 
One might have expected both population growth 
and noncasino private-sector job growth to have 
TABLE B3
Share of Casino Jobs Held by Atlantic County Residents*
Year Date of report Total casino jobs
Held by Atlantic 
County residents
Held by Atlantic 
City residents
Held by county 
balance residents
      Number % of Total Number % of Total Number % of Total
1987 9/28/1987 42,963 29,261 68.1% 9,013 21.0% 20,248 47.1%
1988 10/26/1988 44,612 30,903 69.3% 9,983 22.4% 20,920 46.9%
1989 10/18/1989 44,291 31,711 71.6% 10,261 23.2% 21,450 48.4%
1990 11/17/1990 48,152 34,738 72.1% 11,039 22.9% 23,699 49.2%
1991 12/2/1991 45,087 33,336 73.9% 10,338 22.9% 22,998 51.0%
1992 2/5/1993 44,762 33,365 74.5% 9,957 22.2% 23,408 52.3%
1993 1/1/1994 45,025 33,849 75.2% 9,951 22.1% 23,898 53.1%
1994 1/1/1995 45,489 34,476 75.8% 10,305 22.7% 24,171 53.1%
1995  N/A  N/A N/A  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1996 11/1/1996 48,595 37,808 77.8% 10,846 22.3% 26,962 55.5%
1997 5/15/1997 48,466 37,754 77.9% 10,588 21.8% 27,166 56.1%
1998 3/2/1998 48,046 37,738 78.5% 10,655 22.2% 27,083 56.4%
1999 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
2000 1/2/2001 46,771 38,110 81.5% 10,830 23.2% 27,280 58.3%
2001 1/25/2002 45,163 37,187 82.3% 10,643 23.6% 26,544 58.8%
2002 1/6/2003 44,502 36,923 83.0% 10,579 23.8% 26,344 59.2%
2003 1/1/2004 45,530 37,815 83.1% 10,788 23.7% 27,027 59.4%
2004 1/1/2005 44,823 37,463 83.6% 10,633 23.7% 26,830 59.9%
2005 1/1/2006 43,826 36,807 84.0% 10,226 23.3% 26,581 60.7%
2006 1/5/2007 41,943 35,298 84.2% 9,548 22.8% 25,750 61.4%
2007 1/1/2008 40,400 34,090 84.4% 8,787 21.8% 25,303 62.6%
Source: Data provided by staff at the New Jersey Casino Control Commission.
*For each year, commission staff provided data from the monthly report that would best reflect the job picture at the end of the calendar year.  This would 
typically be the report prepared in January of the following year.  When the January report was not available, the report for the closest date available was used 
as a source of data; with the exception of 1997 and 1998, report dates are relatively close to the end of the relevant calendar year. ATLANTIC CITY: PAST AS PROLOGUE    61 
leveled off considerably after this point, yet county 
population grew by about 28,000 between 1990 and 
2000 and noncasino job growth is not far off the long-
term trend path shown in Figure B2.15 Interestingly, 
some of the noncasino employment growth almost 
certainly continues to be generated by economic 
activity associated with the casino industry itself. For 
example, the number of casino jobs held by Atlantic 
County residents grew by about 3,000 between 1990 
and 2000, although the number has fallen in recent 
years as total casino employment has declined. (See 
Table B3. This table also shows that the share of jobs 
held by county residents has increased continuously 
since 1990.)  More recently, major retail activity 
aimed at Atlantic City tourists, supported by the 
CRDA and thus by funds provided by the casinos, 
has also been a direct source of new jobs.16  
15 Statistics updated to the current decade show that Atlantic 
County has continued to grow faster than the state on both of 
these measures. See the 2006 Atlantic County fact book.
16  It is also possible that the opportunity to visit the casinos in 
Atlantic City may have increased the attractiveness of the county 
as a residential location (or as a location for a second home) for 
some households. 
These factors notwithstanding, it seems 
unlikely that the casino industry would have 
supported the same amount of long-term growth in 
recent decades as it did during or close to its major 
expansion period. In turn, future work might be 
aimed at identifying other sources of job growth in 
Atlantic County. It would be interesting to identify 
the factors that underlie growth in the county balance 
prior to the arrival of casinos and to assess whether 
those factors continued to provide an impetus for 
growth after the casinos were established. Another 
topic that might deserve attention in future research 
is the extent to which new residents who commute 
to the Philadelphia MSA have become a source of 
growth for the county.ATLANTIC CITY: PAST AS PROLOGUE    63 
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